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ABSTRACT
THE ILKHANID MONGOLS, THE CHRISTIAN ARMENIANS, AND THE ISLAMIC
MAMLUKS: A STUDY OF THEIR RELATIONS, 1220-1335
Lauren Prezbindowski
November 15,2012
This work seeks to fill a gap in the academic literature concerning the study of the
Ilkhanid Mongols of the Middle East during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries CE
using Armenian, Persian, Arabic, and Syriac primary sources in English translation. This
study will analyze the triangular relationship among the Ilkhanid Mongols, the Kingdom
of Cilician Armenia and Greater Armenia, and the Egyptian Mamluks to discern the
Ilkhanate's impact in the Middle East. Although the Armenians became subjects of the
Mongols, they did not gain many benefits from this partnership. In fact, their relationship
proved to be overwhelmingly negative. Although the Mamluks were adversaries of the
Mongols, they ultimately benefited greatly from their adversarial stance by establishing
and legitimizing the rule of the martial mamluk caste. This thesis seeks to show the
importance of studying this triangular relationship and its impact on the medieval Middle
East.
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INTRODUCTION
In many ways, the thirteenth century CE can be characterized as 'the Mongol
century.' By the middle of the century, most of Asia and large parts of Europe were
under Mongol control, ruled by the four main branches of Chinggis Khan's family (the
Chinggisids). Chinggis' four sons by his first wife, Borte, formed the four Chingissid
houses. After Chinggis' s death, the sons fought over who would control the empire, even
though Chinggis had designated his third son, Ogedei, as his successor. The eldest son,
Jochi, led the Jochids and his successor Batu formed the Golden Horde, which controlled
Russia and the northern Caucasus. Chinggis' s second son, Chagatai, founded the
Chagatids and ruled the lands in Central Asia nestled between China and Persia. The
third son, Ogedei, assumed the mantle of Great Khan, a position which ruled over all the
other khans, and ruled from the Mongol capital in Karakorum [Qaraqorum]. He also
controlled the lands in China. The fourth and youngest son, Tolui, ruled the lands to the
west, which included Persia and the southern Caucasus.
Inter-familial war remained a constant feature of the Mongol Empire and it was
not until the mid 1200s that the Great Khan was able to order the consolidation, and in
some cases reconquest, of Mongol-controlled lands. The Great Khan Mongke of the
Toluids set his two brothers, Kublai and Hillegfi, to this task. Kublai would rule in the
East (China) and Hillegu would rule in the West (Persia).

1

This thesis focuses on Hiilegu and his founding of the Ilkhanate. On his march
west, the Mongol prince came into contact with numerous peoples and these relationships
greatly defined how he would rule his new kingdom and how the Ilkhanate would exist in
this political landscape. Mongol rule in Persia cannot be studied in a vacuum; scholars
must understand the types of relationships the Ilkhans were involved in, what choices
were available to them, and ultimately what defmed their relationships with each of the
region's peoples.
The arrival of a strong, permanent Mongol presence in Persia and the Caucasus
greatly affected the politics of the area and brought a new political and military force into
the mix. Some peoples, like the Armenians, saw the Mongols as a possible ally, whereas
others, mainly the Egyptian Mamluks, saw the Mongols as a threat. Clearly, the
Armenians and the Mamluks thought very differently about this new Mongol kingdom,
and yet, they both had to address how they would interact with the Ilkhanid Mongols.
The Armenians became the staunchest allies of the Mongols in the Middle East, while the
Mamluks became the greatest threat to Mongol rule in the Middle East.
Despite their opposing stances, the Armenians and Mamluks both sought to take
advantage of the new Ilkhanid presence. In fact, the Armenians and Mamluks came into
direct contact with one another for the first time through their relations with the Mongols.
A triangular relationship quickly developed among the Ilkhanid Mongols, the Armenians,
and Mamluks, in which the decision-making or actions of one power greatly affected the
other two. This thesis seeks to present and study this triangular relationship in detail and
posits that in order to understand the thirteenth century history of anyone of these
kingdoms, the triangular Mongol-Armenian-Mamluk relationship ought to be studied.
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This thesis ultimately seeks to show that the Mamluks, as enemies of the Mongols,
benefited more from their relationship with the Mongols than the Armenians, who were
allies of the Mongols. This will be shown through a calculation of advantages and
disadvantages for both the Armenians and Mamluks in regards to their relationships with
the Ilkhanid Mongols.

3

HISTORIOGRAPHY
George Lane's work, Early Mongol Rule in Thirteenth-Century Iran: A Persian
Renaissance, sought to show a more complex picture of the Mongol presence in Persia by

showing distinctions between the first and second Mongol invasions of the area. Lane's
work focused on the rule of the first Ilkhan Hiilegu by showing complexities not
addressed by many other secondary sources, giving equal consideration to both the
positives and negatives of the Mongol presence in Iran. However, Lane's text did not take
into account the transfer of the Caliphate from Baghdad to Cairo, nor did he completely
flesh out the lasting impact of expelling the Caliphate from Baghdad. Lane's work also
seemed to focus on internal matters in the Ilkhanate, while bypassing the importance of
foreign relations, specifically the Ilkhanate' s relations with the Egyptian Mamluks and
Armenians. The Mongols and Mamluks contended for power in many different arenas,
military, political, economic, and this would have impacted the Ilkhanate as a whole. This
thesis will seek to incorporate more fully the impact of relations among the Mongols,
Mamluks, and Armenians, especially in regards to early Mongol rule in Iran.
Reuven Amitai-Preiss's work, Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War,
1260-81, wished to show the Mongol justifications for continued war against the

Mamluks in Syria, as well as reasoning for Mamluk victory and Mongol defeat in Syria.
Although the chief subject of this work was the Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, the study of this
war is impossible without focusing on the role the Armenians had to play. Amitai-Preiss
did not attribute much importance to the Mamluk drive to exact vengeance against the
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Annenians, nor did he much address the obligations of the Mongols to act as protectors
of the Annenians. This thesis will seek to address both of these major concerns and show
how such obligations and campaigns impacted the overall Mamluk-Ilkhanid War. This
thesis will also take into account the complexities of the conflict, showing how the
Mamluks, Mongols, and Annenians not only warred on the battlefield, but also in the
throne rooms, mosques, pilgrimage routes, and trade caravans. Although Amitai-Preiss
touches on a possible conclusion to the conflict, this thesis will clearly state and show
how the Mamluks emerged victorious in the Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, by transfonning the
fierce Mongol enemy into a mighty political weapon.
Another work on the study of Mamluk-Mongol relations is Anne Broadbridge's
work, Kingship and Ideology in the Islamic and Mongol Worlds. This work sought to
study relations between the Ilkhanid and Jochid Mongols and the Mamluks through the
specific lens of ideology and the motivations created by ideology. Broadbridge sought to
compare and link the Mongol and Mamluk ideologies and the venues through which they
communicated with one another. She especially focuses on the Mongol concept of the
Divine Mandate, although she does not fully address its impact on relations. This thesis
will not only show where and when the Divine Mandate was utilized, it will also show
how the Mandate could be twisted against the interests of the Mongols, how it shaped the
concepts and tenns of submission the Mongols offered their enemies, and how ultimately
the Divine Mandate did not work to the benefit of the Mongols' allies, mainly the
Annenians. Still further, the thesis will show how the Mongols' pursuit of the Divine
Mandate worked to the benefit of the Egyptian Mamluks.
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Although Broadbridge's analysis presented an extremely helpful understanding of
the ideologies and kingship models of the Mongols and Mamluks, it did not address the
Armenians or their ideology. At first glance this may seem appropriate given her study's
focus, but this thesis will counter that even when studying Mamluk and Mongol relations
as shaped by their ideologies, the impact of the Armenians is present. As much as the
Muslirnlheathen dichotomy was used between the Mamluks and Mongols, the
Muslim/Christian dichotomy was also used. The Ilkhanid Mongols were continually
attacked for the supposed favoritism they showed Christians, including the Armenians.
When Arabic authors recounted the horrors of the Mongol attacks they explicitly speak
about the atrocities committed by Christian (Armenian) warriors against the Muslims.
Therefore, Broadbridge's work is missing some of the complexities present in MongolMamluk relations as a result of excluding the study of the Armenians.
Shifting now to Mongol-Armenian relations, Robert Bedrosian's work, The

Turco-Mongol Invasions and the Lords ofArmenia in the I3-Ilh centuries, examined the
impact of the Mongol invasions on the Armenian lordly rulers (naxarar). Bedrosian's
work also sought to utilize and validate primary sources from Armenian authors as there
has been much dispute over the impartiality of these authors. Bedrosian's work focused
on the political and domestic demands made by the Mongols and the impacts of the
Mongol conflict in Greater Armenia. But Bedrosian gave little attention to the terms of
submission the Armenian princes had to accept from the Mongols. The Mongols
instituted heavy taxes in some regions, while demanding a vast quantity of supplies and
support for its armies. The cost of reconstruction and recovery after the Mongol invasion
is also not discussed, nor is the cost of lives considered. This thesis will seek to address
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all of these issues and show how these demands negatively impacted the Armenians, both
in the short and long tenn. Bedrosian also gave little attention to the impact of other
external threats. These external threats, mainly the Mamluks, created the circumstances in
which the Mongols placed their demands on the Annenian princes. As such, these
external threats need to be factored into the study of Mongol-Annenian relations. An
analysis of the Mamluk threat to the Armenians will also present an opportunity to
analyze how the Mongol-Armenian alliance operated and what benefits it may have
conferred on the Armenians. This thesis will present such an analysis and present the
overall conclusion that the benefits the Armenians earned from their Mongol alliance did
not outweigh its negative effects.
Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog's work, The Mongols and the Armenians (1220-1335),
argued that the vast Mongol Empire would have been impossible to run without
establishing and maintaining local political ties in its conquered lands. This work also
sought to show how both parties, the Mongol commanders (later Ilkhans) and the Greater
Armenian princes, benefited from their relationship. The study relied strongly on the
works of contemporary Annenian authors. Chiefly among them were: Kirakos of Ganjak,
Vardan Arewelci, Grigor of Akner, Stepannos Orbelian, and Stepannos Episkopos.
Although Dashdondog's work utilized some Persian sources, it mainly utilized Armenian
and Georgian sources, which limited its scope. This work talked about some of the
connections between the Armenians and Mongols with the Mamluks, but the lack of
Arabic sources limited the depth of the infonnation provided. This thesis will take a more
inclusive approach by utilizing Armenian, Arabic, Persian, and Syriac sources in

7

translation and will analyze both the benefits and drawbacks of the Mongol-Armenian
relationship.
For research on Armenian-Mamluk relations, Angus Donal Stewart's work,
Armenian Kingdom and the Mamluks: War and Diplomacy during the Reigns ofHe tum II
(1289-1307), was consulted. Stewart's first argument was that no work has attempted to

put the history of the Kingdom of Cilician Armenia into the wider context of the political
climate ofthe Near and Middle East. Secondly, he stated that previous scholarship relied
heavily on Crusader and Armenian primary sources, which usually left out the wealth of
information Arabic sources have to offer. Stewart showed that one can clearly trace the
Armenians' increasingly subservient status with respect to the Mamluk Sultanate chiefly
through Arabic sources. He also analyzed the Cilicia Armenian-Ilkhanid Mongol
relationship and succinctly showed the benefits the Armenians experienced from this
partnership, but Stewart left some questions unanswered. Was the alliance with the
Mongols beneficial in the long term for the Armenians? Would the Armenians and
Mamluks have fought against one another without the Mongols? Such questions were left
open to interpretation; this thesis will seek to answer these questions.
Finally, Robert Irwin's work, The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early
Mamluk Sultanate 1250- 1382, proved to be the best secondary source on showcasing the

linkages among the Mongols, Armenians, and Mamluks. Irwin's work offered valuable
insight into the mixing of Mongol and Mamluk cultures and peoples and how this mixing
colored relations between the two. As with Stewart's work, Irwin left similar questions
unanswered and did not provide a cost-benefit analysis of these relationships. This thesis
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will present such an analysis and present the conclusion that the Mamluks benefited the
most from their interactions with the Mongols and Armenians.
Some of the sources mentioned above provided short-term analyses of certain
benefits or aspects of a relationship, but no source ventured a longer-term analysis. A
long-term analysis of these relationships and an analysis of advantages and disadvantages
for all three powers are needed. This idea of advantages and disadvantages is particularly
interesting and pertinent to studying the Mongol-Armenian-Mamluk relationship because
the Mongols, especially the Ilkhanid Mongols, were new players to the region. Both the
Armenians and the Mamluks consciously decided what type of relationship each would
have with the Ilkhanid Mongols. Therefore, it is especially important to understand what
choices were before them and how they went about making these decisions. Many such
decisions are motivated by what is beneficial to the kingdom or its ruler, so a cost-benefit
style analysis is useful in this thesis. This thesis will study what benefits each party
sought to gain and then what the actual outcomes were and how these outcomes impacted
those involved. This thesis will take a more holistic perspective by studying the triangular
relationship among the Mongols, Armenians, and Mamluks. This thesis seeks to show
that the Mamluks, as enemies of the Mongols, benefited more from their relationship
with the Mongols than the Armenians, who were allies of the Mongols. This thesis seeks
to address two gaps in present scholarship: the lack of a comprehensive analysis of
Mongol-Armenian-Mamluk relations and the presentation of a definitive stance on who
ultimately emerged victorious in the MongoliArmenian-Mamluk rivalry.
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PRIMARY SOURCES

This study utilized a wide variety of primary sources, all found in English
translation. The majority of primary sources were written during the time period
discussed, the mid thirteenth century through the mid fourteenth century CEo Several
other sources written in the fifteenth and sixteenth centurires were consulted. The
contemporary sources utilized were written in medieval Arabic, Armenian, Persian,
French, Latin, and Syriac.

Armenian Sources

The most helpful Armenian source was the Tatarats Patmutiwn, more commonly
known as 'the History of the Nation ofArchers,' written by Grigor of Akner (1250-

1335).1 It described events relating to the Armenians from the time ofChinggis Khan to
1273.2 Another important source from the period was the Patmutiwn Hayots (History of

the Armenians) written by Kirakos of Ganjak (1200-1271).3 This work contained the
political history of Annenia from its Christianisation (c. 301 CE) to 1266/67. The source
was most important because it included the first and second Mongol invasions of
Armenia and gave the most detailed account of the Mongols from the Armenian

I Grigor of Almer, History of the Nation of Archers (the Mongols), trans. Robert P. Blake, Richard N. Frye,
"Grigor of Almer's History of the Nation of Archers (the Mongols)," HJAS 12:3/4 (December, 1949): 269399.
2 Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog, The Mongols and the Armenians (1220-1335) (Boston: Brill, 2011), 16-17.
3 Kirakos of Ganjak, History of the Armenians, trans. John Andrew Boyle, "Kirakos of Ganjak on the
Mongols," Central Asiatic Journal, Vol. 3, No.3, (1963).
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perspective. 4 Kirakos was captured along with his teacher Vanakan Vardapet by the
Mongol commander Molar in Lorut, while taking shelter from the Mongol slaughter in
Khwarazm. The Mongols pressed Kirakos into their service as a secretary; he wrote and
read letters for the Mongol commanders in the summer of 1236, gaining invaluable
insight into the Mongol ways.5 Vardan Arewelci (ca. 1200-1271) was also a pupil of
Vanakan Vardapet and wrote during the same period. 6 The works of Vardan and Kirakos
often reinforced one another. Vardan's work, the Hawakumn Patmutean (Historical

Compilation) was written as a chronicle, telling the history of the world from the time of
the Biblical Genesis to 1267. Vardan provided a unique Armenian perspective in that he
discussed clerical attitudes toward the Mongol invasion,7 and Vardan went to see HUlegii
Khan in 1264 and was received with honor.8
Although not directly quoted in the thesis, there were numerous other
contemporary Armenian sources that were helpful in researching the period. These
sources and authors included the Annuals written by Sebastatsi;9 the Patmutiwn

Nahangin Sisakan (the History of the Siwnik' Province) written by Stepannos Orbelian
(1250160-1304);10 the works of Hetum Patmich (Hetum the Historian), also known as

Hayton; the fourteenth century work of Nerses Palients;ll the Armenian Colophons; 12 and

More specifically Kirakos gives accounts of the crushing of Georgian forces in 1220/21; the submission
ofCilician Armenian King Hetum I; Hetum I's campaigns into Syria; the Mongol sacking of Baghdad; the
agreement between the Mongols and Armenians, see Dashdondog, the Armenians, 11-14.
5 Kirakos also interacted with Greater Armenian nobles, including Pros Xalbakean, who participated in the
Mongol conquest of Baghdad in 1258, and Grigor Mamikoriean, who told him about Chinggis Khan, see
Robert Gregory Bedrosian, Turco-Mongol Invasions and the Lords ofArmenia in the 13 th and 14th
Centuries (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1979),25.
6 Vardan Arewe1ci, The Historical Compilation, trans. Robert W. Thomson (Washington D.C., Dumbarton
Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1989), 127.
7 Dashdondog, the Armenians, 14-15.
8 Bedrosian, Turco-Mongol Invasions, 29.
9 Dashdondog, the Armenians, 19.
10 Ibid. 17-18.
11 Dashdondog, the Armenians, 25.
4
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The Anonymous Chronicle in the Georgian History ofKartli. 13 All of these sources were
helpful in gaining context for Annenia, Georgia, and Anatolia during the period under
study.

Persian Sources
The most important source for the history of the Mongol conquest of Persia was
the work of Ala aI-Din Ata Malik Juwayni (1226-83), called the Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha
(History of the World Conqueror), completed circa 1260.

14

Juwayni was a leading

member of Hiilegii's administration and was an eyewitness to many of the important
events during Hiilegii's reign. IS He helped to establish the new Mongol capital at
Maragheh and witnessed the destruction of the Ismailis (Assassins). Hiilegii appointed
Juwayni the governor of Baghdad after its conquest in 1258. 16 Juwayni's history was
quite different from others of the period because his perspective was from one who lived
and worked under established Mongol rule in Persia, whereas many other authors
experienced the Mongol invasions.
The most important work for the late Ilkhanid period was Rashid al-Din's (12741318) Sucessors of Genghis Khan. 17 Rashid aI-Din was the Grand Vizier of Ghazan and

12 Colophons were writings usually found at the end of a manuscript and were most often made by the
manuscript's copyist or recipient. They contained information such as the copyist's name, the year the
manuscript was copied, and the year the colophon was made. They could also contain lengthy addenda on
political and military developments, taxation, agriculture, and the conditions of the villages, towns,
monasteries, and churches in the region, see Bedrosian, Turco-Mongol Invasions, 51.
13 Bedrosian, Turco-Mongol Invasions, 57.
14 Ala-ad-Din Ata-Malik Juwayni, The History o/the World Conqueror, trans. John Andrew Boyle
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 1958.
15 George Lane, Early Mongol rule in the thirteenth century Iran: a Persian Renaissance (New York:
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 3.
16 Dashdondog, the Armenians, 28.
17 Rashid ai-Din, The Sucessors o/Genghis Khan, trans. John Andrew Boyle (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1971).
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accompanied Ghazan on his last expedition, 1302-03, against the Mamluks. 18 Several
other helpful sources that were utilized included Khwaja Nasir ai-Din Tusi's (1201-74)19
Zij al-Ilkhani (Ilkanic Tables) and Minhaj aI-Din Saraj Juzjani's the Nasiri Tables. 20 Tusi
provided a factual unembellished account of the fall of Baghdad in 1258, in which he
took part and he was a financial adviser to both Hiilegii Khan and Abaqa Khan. 21
Juzjani's work covered the first stage of the Mongols' conquest of Armenia and had been
a witness to this Mongol conquest. Both Juzjani and Juwayni recounted some of the same
events, which gave credence to both.
Although not directly quoted in the thesis, there were numerous other
contemporary Persian sources that were helpful in researching the period. These sources
included Abdallah ibn Fazlallah of Shiraz's (also known as Wassaf)22 Tarikh-i Wassaf
(The History ofWassaj); Abu al-Qasem Abdollah Qashani's Tarikh-i O/jeitii (The
History ofO/jeitii);23 Hamd Allah Mustawfi Qazini's Tarikh-i Guzida (the Selected
History) and the Nazhat al-Qulub (Pleasure of the Hearts); and the works of Shams alDin Ahmad al_Aflaki. 24 All of these sources provided helpful contextual information on
Persia during the time period under study.

Rashid-a! Din, The Successors ofGenghis Khan, 4.
Ibid. 6, 8.
20 Lane, Persian Renaissance, 3.
21 Ibid. 8.
22 Ibid. 6-7.
23 Ibid. 6-7.
24 Ibid. 7.
18
19
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Arabic Sources
The most important primary source found in a complete English translation was
Ibn al-Athir's (1160-1233) al-Kamil jil-tarikh (Complete History).25 AI-Athir relied on
second hand accounts of refugees from the Mongol conquests 26 and his work contained
information relating to the Mongols in Syria. The other Arabic primary sources were
found in English through secondary sources. One such example was Baybars alMansuri's (d. 1324-25) Kitab al-Tuhfa al-mulukiyya jil-dawla al-Turkiyya, 27 a chronicle
of the Mamluk sultans from their beginning (c. 1250) to 1311-12. AI-Mansuri served the
Sultans Mansur Sayf aI-Din Qalawun al-Alfi and ai-Nasir Muhammad, during whose first
two reigns al-Mansuri held the great office of dawadar (executive secretary). By 1312 alMansuri was appointed vice regent in Egypt, the highest appointed office in the
Sultanate. The extant pieces ofal-lazari's (d. 1338) work, Hawadith al-zaman,28
provided pertainent information on the Mongols through the lens of a Mamluk author,
while preserving the observations of earlier Mamluk authors.
Although not directly quoted in the thesis, there were numerous other
contemporary Arabic sources that were helpful in researching the period. These sources
included Sayfal-Din Abu Bakr ibn al-Dawadari's Kanz al-Durar wa-Jami al-Ghurar (the
Treasure ofPearls and Trove of the Radiant);29 Shihab ai-Din Ahmad al-Nuwayri's

25 Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil fil-tarikh, Part 3, The Years 589-62911193-1231, The Ayyubids after Saladin and
the Mongol Menace, trans. D.S. Richards (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008).
26 Lane, Persian Renaissance, 177.
27 P. M. Holt, "Literary Offerings: a genre of courtly literature," ed. Thomas Philipp, Ulrich Haarmann, The
Mamluks in Egyptian politics and society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4.
28 Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 5.
29 No English translation available.
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Nihayat ai-Arab fi Funun al-Adab (All That Can be Desired in the Scribal Arts);3o Ibn
Fadl Allah al-Umari's Masalik al-Absar fi Mamalik al-Amsar (Paths ofDiscernment into
the Kingdoms of the Lands);31 Shams aI-din Ibrahim b. Abd aI-Rahman al-Qaysarani's alNur al-laih wal-durr al-sadihfi stifa mawlana ai-sultan ai-Malik al-Salih;32 Abul-Fida's
(d. 1332) Kitab al-Mukhtasar (Compendious Book),33 and Taqi aI-Din Ahmad aIMaqrizi's comprehensive history of Egypt.
Yet another helpful source was the work ofIbn Abd al-Zathir (1233-1293), who
was a biographer of Sultan al-Zathir Rukn aI-Din Baybars al-Blmduqdari and wrote the
al-Rwad al-zahir fi sirat ai-Malik al-Zathir. This work was of importance for its coverage
of Baybars's role at the battle of Ayn lalut in 1260. 34 Shaft b. Ali al-Asqalani (d. 1330),
the nephew ofIbn Abd al-Zathir, also wrote a biography of Baybars Bunduqdari (after
Baybars's death) called the Husn al-manaqib al-sirriyya al-muntazaa min al-sira alZahiriyya. 35 All of these sources provided helpful contextual information on Egypt and
Syria on the period under study.

Other Language Sources
The works of Bar Hebraeus, the Political History of the Worldand the
Chronology of Gregory Abu al-Faraj, both in Syriac, were consulted in depth.36 Both
works were utilized in full English translation. Bar Hebraeus' s history of the early

No English translation available.
No English translation available.
32 The exact translation of the title could not be found, but the work certainly concerns the reign of the
Ayyubid sultan ai-Malik al-Salih, who ruled Egypt from 1240 to 1249, see Holt, "Literary Offerings," 7-8.
33 Dashdondog, the Armenians, 29.
34 This work was basically a biography of Baybars al-Bunduqdari, see Broadbridge, Kingship & Ideology,
266.
35 Holt, "Literary Offerings," 5.
36 Dashdondog, the Armenians, 30.
30

31
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Ilkhans, found in the Political History of the World, was often based on his own
experiences and he was allowed access to the Ilkhan's libraries in Maragheh and Tabriz.
The Chronology of Gregory Abu al-Faraj aided in comparing Syriac Christian to
Armenian Christian sources, which shed light on Mongol-Christian and Christian-Muslim
relations.
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THE PRELIMINARY HISTORICAL NARRATIVE
As this study revolves around the Mongols in Persia, a cursory understanding of
the Mongols and their move into Persia is needed. The Mongols first emerged on the
world stage under the unifying leadership ofChinggis Khan (1167-1227), known to many
Western audiences as Genghis Khan, in the beginning of the thirteenth century. After his
unification of the Central Asian nomadic tribes and his conquest of the Xi Xia, Chinggis
Khan wished to establish trade between his lands and Persia. To this end he sent an
ambassador to Sultan Mahamad of Persia along with a train of 400 merchants to buy
wares in Persia. Unfortuntately, the Sultan murdered the Mongol ambassadors and
merchants, which incited Chinggis' s great anger and brought war upon the Khwarazm
Empire, which constituted much of Iran and Afghanistan and all of Transoxiana. 37
Chinggis succeeded in defeating the Khwarazm Empire, sacking its capital Samarqand,
by 1220.
The Mongols' first campaign into Persia (1219-1221) and the Caucasus caused
great destruction with many cities sacked; thousands were killed; and infrastructure,
including the vital irrigation systems, was destroyed. The Mongols left few forces to
maintain control of Persia and the Caucasus, as most of the army was needed to confront
the Chinese kingdoms. The small force that was left was led by the Mongol generals

37 Ibn a1-Athir, A l-Kiimil fil-tarikh, quoted from Robert Irwin, The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The
Early Mamluk Sultanate 1250-1382 (Carbondale: Southern lllinois University Press, 1986), 13.
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Chormaghan, Eljigidei, and Baiju/ 8 and it was they who later complained to the Great
Khan Mongke (r. 1252-1259) concerning the Ismailis (Assassins) and Caliphate
aggressions. 39 It was not until 1257 that the Mongols sought to consolidate their power in
the Middle East. The Great Khan Mongke commanded his brother Hiilegii to go west
with a great army to subdue those lands once under the control of the Mongols by
defeating the troublesome Ismailis and the Caliph of Baghdad. 4o Hiilegii set out in 1257
but did not arrive in Persia unti11259.
The Mongols only completed their conquest of Armenia after three campaigns
from 1239 to 1244.41 The Mongols richly rewarded those who submitted (this acted as an
inducement to the hesitant) while simultaneously devastating the lands of those who still
resisted. 42 According to Grigor of Akner, Chinggis Khan allegedly said to his commander
Chormaghan: "It is the will of God that we take the earth and maintain order, and impose
the (y)asax, that they abide by our command and give us tzyu, mal, tayar, and ypcur.
Those, however, who do not submit to our command or give us tribute, slay them and
destroy their place, so that the others who hear and see should fear and not act thus.,,43
This was the policy set forth in dealing with resistors and only a handful of Armenian
princes were brave or foolish enough to attempt resistance.
The other area of Armenian rule that was greatly affected by the Mongols was the
kingdom of Cilician Armenia, which was located on the southern coast of Anatolia near
Reuven Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 1260-81 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 9.
39 Dashdondog, the Armenians, 122.
40 Concurrently, the Great Khan M5ngke also commanded another brother Kublai to consolidate the
Chinese lands to the east. Kublai did so, establishing the Mongol (Yuan) dynasty in China.
41 The first Mongol campaign took Ani and Kars in 1239, the second took Karin in 1242, and the third with
the defeat of the Seljuk Sultan in 1244, see A.E. Redgate, The Armenians (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,
1998),259.
42 Bedrosian, Turco-Mongol Invasions, 174.
43 Grigor, Nation of Archers, 30l.
38
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the northern border of Syria. 44 The kingdom of Cilician Armenia's relationship with the
Mongols began when its king, Hetum I, had the foresight to surrender to the Mongols
before they threatened his lands: "Then the pious and Christ-crowned King of Armenia,
Hetum ... taking counsel, came to the decision to submit to the Tatars [Mongols] and give
them tribute and xalan so as not to let them into their own God-created and Christ-formed
country.,,45
Hetum I further showed his allegiance to the Great Khan by handing over the
royal family of the Sultan of Rum, who had sought refuge at Hetum's court from the
Mongols. 46 For his actions, Hetum was allowed to keep his kingdom and was given
vassal status, in which he had to supply the Mongols with troops and supplies at any
moment, pay taxes, and maintain loyalty. In return, the Mongols promised military
protection against Armenia's Muslim neighbors. 47
Surprisingly, the Egyptian Mamluks owed their very existence to the Mongols. As
the Mongols grew in power they swept west across the Eurasian steppe, pushing other
weaker nomadic tribes still farther west until they reached the Near East, the Black Sea
region, and the eastern edge of Europe. One such group, the Kipchak Turks, were
enslaved and bought by eager Egyptian buyers, who needed large numbers of fearsome
warriors, which they called mamluks. The Mongol invasions of the 1220s and 1230s
created a plentiful slave population from the many refugees. 48

Edmond Schutz, "Annenia: A Christian Enclave in the Islamic Near East in the Middle Ages," ed.
Michael Gervers, Ramzi Jibran Bikhazi, Conversion and continuity: indigenous Christian communities in
Islamic lands, eighth to eighteenth centuries (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1990),22526.
45 Grigor, Nation of Archers, 309.
46 Dashdondog, the Armenians, 80.
47 Ibid. 80.
48 Irwin, The Early Mamluk Sultanate, 17-18.
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Mamluks could come from almost any people, but the Turks were prized and
sought after because of what contemporaries saw as their inherent military quality. The
Turks, like the Mongols, were a nomadic people where violence was part of daily life.
Nomads often raided the herds of livestock and horses of other tribes and imprisoned
those they defeated in battle to be sold as slaves. Turks often sold other Turks acquired
through war or, during times of famine and hardship, families sold their children. 49
Both Mamluks and Mongols were military elites of the Eurasian steppe who ruled
over large Muslim populations and based their armies on disciplined masses of mounted
archers. The Mamluks took up a sedentary lifestyle once they began ruling in Egypt and
functioned as an urban military class. They stayed connected to their nomadic heritage
through their continual purchasing of slaves from the Black Sea, especially from the
Kipchak tribe. Once the Kipchak slaves were brought to Egypt they were trained to
become mamluks, the Islamic faith's most ardent supporters and holy warriors. 50
During the reign of the Mamluks in Egypt, enslavement as a mamluk was seen as
a step toward acquiring power and position within the Sultanate. 51 It was a respected
position that was given great responsibilities and power. Often times, mamluk regiments
constituted the sultan's royal bodyguard. 52 Mamluks were first and foremost military
slaves, but they could also perform ceremonial or administrative tasks. Mamluks served
as cupbearers, equerries, and falconers, but also provincial governors, major-domos of
the royal household or treasurers. The slavery of the mamluks allowed them to develop
their martial skills, especially with time consuming and difficult skills such as horse
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archery. In addition, it enabled the establishment of loyalty due from the mamluk to his
master/owner, or ustadh. A mamluk was often taught other skills beyond the martial.
They were often taught to speak Arabic and sometimes taught to read and write Arabic as
well. 53
In 1240, Sultan AI-Salih Ayyub created a new elite corps of mamluks, called the
Bahriyya,54 comprised mainly of Kipchak mamluks. AI-Salih relied heavily on the
military advice of his Bahriyya amirs (chieftain/commander), not trusting in his Ayyubid
dynastic family, which had ruled Egypt since 1174. AI-Salih died in 1249 amidst a great
military crisis and subsequent political wars followed. 55 From this power struggle it
became clear that the Bahri mamluks were more powerful than previously thought, but it
was the threat of the Mongols that finally thrust the Bahri to the throne in 1250.
The history of the Egyptian Sultanate from 1249 to 1259 was one of complex
political maneuverings and murders. Powerful amirs, Ayyubid princes, and Bahri

mamluks used young Ayyubid princes as figureheads on the throne, while they fought
amongst themselves. AI-Muizz Aybak claimed the throne in 1257, but was murdered
soon after. His young son, the fifteen year old aI-Mansur Nur aI-Din Ali, was put on the
throne to keep up the fayade of legitimacy. Ultimately it was AI-Muizz Aybak's most
favored mamluk, Qutuz al-Muizzi, who gained power. 56 Qutuz took direct control of the
throne in 1259 soon after hearing that the Mongols had entered Syria. 57

Ibid. 4-5.
The title of 'Bahriyya' refers to where this corps was garrisoned; on the island of Rawda on the River
Nile (Bahr ai-Nil) outside of Cairo, see Irwin, The Early Mamluk Sultanate, 18.
55 The Ayyubid prince of Aleppo, ai-Nasir Yusuf, occupied Damascus and would later playa prominent
role in Ayyubid/Mamluk/Mongol relations, see Irwin, Early Mamluk Sultanate, 22.
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The Mamluks came into direct contact with the kingdom of Cilician Armenia as a
result of the Mongols; the Armenians were military allies of the Mongols during the long
Ilkhanid-Mamluk conflict. Armenian incursions into northern Syria against the Mamluks
were unsuccessful and the Mamluks sought to exact vengeance against the Armenians for
their foolish raids. The Mamluks sent multiple raids into Cilicia, devastated the land and
ultimately forced the Armenians to accept a greatly disadvantageous peace in 1285. The
Mamluks ultimately brought the Cilician Armenians under heel in 1375, when they
captured the Cilician royal family and the capital of Sis.
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THE SECOND MONGOL INVASION OF PERSIA
Mongke of the Toluid family was elected Great Khan in 1252; among his first
acts was to enact a new expansionist phase for the Empire, both by consolidating
previously held lands and conquering new areas. Mongke assigned one of his brothers,
Hulegii, to reconquer the lands ofIran and the southern Caucasus. Rashid aI-Din
described: "To conquer the lands of the enemies ... until you have many summer and
winter camps."S8 Reuven Amitai-Preiss further described HUlegii's charge: "To enact the
laws ofChinggis Khan in the lands from the River Oxus (Jayhun) up to the edge of the
land of Egypt."s9 HUlegii was then given instructions to carry on further conquests of new
lands as he saw fit; Syria was certainly a goal and the primary sources hint that Egypt
was within the sights of the Great Khan. 60
HUlegii's mission first dictated that before he could conquer new lands, he had to
deal with the rebellious elements within the Mongols' realm. Mongol commanders in
Iran had sent complaints to the Great Khan concerning attacks fi'om the Ismailis
(Assassins) and mountain rebels and the increased aggressiveness of the Caliph of
Baghdad. Therefore, HUlegu's first task was to eliminate the Ismailis concentrated in
eastern Iran and south of the Caspian Sea. The second task was to put down the rebellious
Kurds and Lurs and the third was to render the submission of the Caliph. 61
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Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 12.
60 Ibid. 13.
61 Ibid. 12.

58

59

23

Hiilegii left his ordu (camp) in February 1254 for the Middle East, arriving
outside Samarqand in September 1255. 62 As Hiilegii's army marched across the Middle
East, he made appeals to the various local and regional rulers to offer submission to him
as a representative of the Great Khan. He also demanded that they prepare for his arrival
into their lands and be able to provide for his army. This type of material support was
expected of any group who became vassals of the Mongols. Juwayni described the
process through which the Mongols made demands of their vassals:
... The emirs and local rulers, whoever they were, began to prepare
provisions (ulufa) and get together tuzghu or offerings of food; and they
set down their offerings at every stage [of the army's advance). At the
same time the Mongol and Moslem emirs brought herds of mares and each
in turn manufactured qumiz until the troops passed on to another emir.
And the route along which it was calculated that the World-King would
pass was cleared ... and bridges were built over the rivers and streams and
boats held in readiness at the ferries. 63

As part of his demands for submission, Hiilegii also demanded local leaders to
provide military forces to take part in his campaign across the Middle East. Rashid aI-Din
explained that "when Hiilegii Khan was coming to Persia the decree was issued that from
each of the princely houses a prince should join him with an army to assist him ... ,,64
Hiilegii began his campaign in 1256, acquiring staunch allies in King Hetum I ofCilician
Armenia and the Greater Armenian lords under the Georgian King David VII DIu (r.
1247-1270).65 The Armenians would remain the Mongols' strongest allies throughout
Hiilegii's campaign. The Armenians and Georgians had supported the Mongols in their
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past campaigns, particularly against the Sultanate of Rum, and they could be counted
upon to provide forces again.
Local allies were also needed because the Mongol force was too small to
accomplish its goals alone. It was standard practice to use local forces as a significant
portion of the Mongols' forces in any given area. Local forces were often led by small
Mongol contingents as was the case in much of the Persian theater of operations. Juwayni
related how Mongol forces were used in Persia: "The World-King's forces encamped in
the district of Talaqan and he ordered the armies of Kerman and Yezd to besiege the local
castles such as Aluh-Nishin, Mansuriya and several others; and he strengthened the hand
of these troops with a force of Mongols who were their mainstay (muawal).,,66 Juwayni
went on to list numerous local Persian leaders who joined Hiilegii in his campaign to
retake the Middle East in 1260:
When the Royal banners had passed through that region the Supreme
Minister (sahib-i-azam) Masud Beg and the emirs of Transoxiana joined
his [Hiilegii's] train ... Muhammad [Shams-ad-Din Muhammad, founder of
the Kart dynasty of Herat], son of Miqdat, came toward to welcome the
King in advance of all his peers and equals and was distinguished amongst
mankind by many marks of favor and honor ... [Upon reaching Kish] the
emir Arghun and most of the chief men ofKhorasan reached them and
offered their presents. 67

Many of these Persian leaders were Ayyubid princes, of the Ayyubid dynastic family in
Egypt, which the Mamluks deposed. This was also true in Syria, where the Mongols and
Mamluks contended for power. These princes remained strong in their localized areas
and could prove to be valuable allies for the Mongols (and the Mamluks). The most
important Ayyubid rulers for the Mongols were those who ruled in Syria. On the eve of
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the Mongol invasion, Syria was split among three Ayyubid princes: aI-Nasir Yusufb. alAziz Muhammad, ruler of Aleppo and Damascus; aI-Mansur Muhammad b. aI-Muzaffar
Mahmud, ruler of Hama; and AI-Mughith Umar b. al-Adil Abu Bakr b. al-Kamil
Muhammad, ruler of Karak .68
The Mongols were only partially successful in gaining the service of these three
strong princes. AI-Nasir Yusufb. al-Aziz Muhammad, ruler of Aleppo and Damascus,
vacillated between supporting the Mongols and Mamluks, ultimately to his great
detriment. 69 AI-Mansur Muhammad b. aI-Muzaffar Mahmud, ruler of Hama, had been on
the Mamluk side since the Mongol invasion and he was rewarded by the Mamluks by
receiving his kingdom again and the lands of Maarrat al-Numan and Barin. 7o AI-Mughith
Umar b. al-Adil Abu Bakr b. al-Kamil Muhammad supported the Mongols in his capacity
as the ruler of Karak. Other Muslim rulers who aided the Mongols included Badr aI-Lulu
ofMosul, AI-Said Hasan of Banias, and many others. 7l Prince ai-Ashraf Musa b. alMansur Ibrahim of Horns marched into battle with the Mongols at Ayn Jalut, but he
switched sides during the battle and his timely desertion helped defeat the Mongols.72
Once Htilegii had his armies assembled and his allies secured, he went against the
fortresses of the Ismailis, who were seen as a great threat to the people of the region. The
Syrian chronicler, Bar Hebraeus, described the victory of the Mongols over the Ismailis:
"By means of these blessed captures God had mercy on the kings of the Arabs and
Christians who lived in terror and trembling through the fear of the Ishmaelites [Ismailis]
Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 19-20.
Yusufhad formally submitted to the Mongols before HUlegii's arrival in 1241. When HUlegU conquered
Iran, Yusuffailed to show proper respect as a vassal, by failing to send gifts, troops, or even recognition to
the khan. After false showings of reconciliation, Yusuftook a belligerent stance against HUlegU and sought
the aid of the Mamluks.
70 Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 45.
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who were carriers of daggers and were shedders of innocent blood.,,73 The Muslim
peoples were very keen to aid the Mongols in this pursuit and " ... orders were then given
for the fastening of banners and standards [to lances] and the massing of the troops for
the purpose of making holy war and uprooting the castles of the Heresy. And all the
forces in that region, whether Turks or Taziks, put themselves in readiness.,,74 The
Armenians' first campaign alongside Hiilegu occurred during the Ismailis campaign in
1256; one of their greatest achievements was the conquest of Alamut.
After his victory over the Ismailis, Hiilegti marched to the city of Baghdad and
called upon Caliph Mustasim to surrender the city. According to George Lane:
Hiilegti was anxious to avoid further bloodshed and urged his assistant and
scholar Nasir aI-Din Tusi to compose a letter to the Caliph, beseeching
him to see reason and to desist from his continued stubbornness. Hiilegti
promised good fortune and a robe of honour for the Caliph Mustasim if he
should comply with the inevitable. However, Nasir aI-Din Tusi's letter
was rejected and the Caliph sent his response with insults and verbal
abuse. 75
Vardan Arewelci wrote: "Hulawu [Hiilegti] slew with his own hands the Caliph, whose
name was Mustasr.,,76 After the capture of the city in 1258, Hiilegti executed the Caliph
and secured the city.77 It should be noted that "there is little in the sources to suggest that
Hiilegti decided on the Caliph's fate or indeed the fate of Baghdad out of malice, a thirst
for blood, or a particular penchant for violence ... though Hiilegti was resolute once he had
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determined upon [the city's] destruction, it should be noted that the devastation was
selective and not all were killed and not all was destroyed.,,78
Once Hiilegil had consolidated his gains, he officially founded the Mongol
kingdom of the Ilkhanate with its center at Maragheh. Hiilegil ruled this new kingdom on
behalf of the Great Khan, acting as a lesser khan in the Mongol Empire. Hiilegil took the
title of Ilkhan,79 although there is no evidence that Mongke Khan bestowed this title on
him. It is clear that the title was in use by 1259-60 during Hiilegii's reign. The origins of
the title 'ilkhan' are not entirely known; the majority of scholars believe it derived from
the old Turkic title, elkhan, which meant 'ruler.' Another meaning is 'subservient or
submissive ruler [khan]. ,80
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TERMS OF SUBMISSION TO THE MONGOLS
The first standard Mongol procedure Hiilegii enacted was the issuing of demands
for surrender and submission from all of the rulers and peoples he encountered. The
demand for surrender was simple and can be seen in numerous primary sources. One
such example was when the Mongol military commander AsIan made an appeal to the
Armenian lord Elikum Orbelian to surrender. According to Bedrosian, Vardan Arewelci
related AsIan's offer: "Make friends with us [the Mongols]; come to us, and you will find
many benefits from us. Otherwise, no matter how long you sit on your rock [in his
fortress], we shall not quit this land. For God has given us this [land] as patrimony, and
when you come forth, it will be the ruin of you and your tun [House].,,81 Faced with the
real possibility of destruction, Elikum subsequently surrendered. Many lords found
Mongol demands to be palatable compared to the alternative: death.
Mongol terms of submission generally included the following: war service in the
khan's armies; supplying the Mongol armies; extraction of taxes from the subjugated
people; submission must be given in person to the Great Khan in Karakorum; the
subjugated people must be obedient in all ways to the Mongols. Those princes and lords
who submitted made visits to Hiilegu at Maragheh in 1258, including vassals from
Mosul, Fars, Rum, and Caucasia. 82 According to Bedrosian, Kirakos related the surrender
of the Armenian prince Hasan Jalal: "the [Mongols] ... ordered him to come to them each
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year for war service, and ingenuously to be obedient to them.,,83 Kirakos then related the
terms of Hasan Jalal's surrender; in return for Hasan Jalal's submission, Hiilegfi "honored
him and gave him back his land and other lands besides ... ,,84
Upon surrender, the Mongols often treated their enemies with clemency. An
analysis of the treatment of the Islamic ruler, Rukn ad-Din, shows that even after
engaging in open hostilities with the Mongols, he was able to surrender and was treated
well by Hiilegii:
And he [Hiilegii] again sent elchis [messengers] in advance to say that he
had put into effect his intention to move forward against Rukn-ad-Din.
The latter had added to his former crimes hollow excuses and feeble
evasions but if he would make his heart sincere again and come forward to
meet the King, he would read the lesson: 'What is past is past' over his
crimes, and cast the glance of forgiveness and condonation upon his
offenses, and show the teeth of assent in the face of his requests. 85

The Mongols also showed favor to their vassals through marriage. But these links
were not used to create any sense of equality between the Mongols and their vassals;
rather, the Mongols used these marriage links to further control their vassals and increase
their indebtedness. This inequality can be seen in the treatment of Rukn-ad-Din. Once he
submitted, all of his possessions were placed under Mongol control; his army was divided
up among the emirs and he had to accompany Hiilegii to the royal ordu in the region of
Hamadan. Hiilegii sent elchis to fetch the remaining enemy commanders, assess the
treasuries in the captured castles and guard the enemy castles until larger Mongol forces
could arrive. According to Juwayni: "As for Rukn-ad-Din he was viewed with attention
and kindness by the King ... at the King's command, [a Mongol wife] was bestowed upon
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[Rukn-ad-Din] ... After the consummation of his marriage he asked the King to send him
to the Court of MengU Qaan [M5ngke Khan]. The King approved his request. .. ,,86 The
vassal still had to pay respects to the Great Khan, despite being highly honored with a
wife.
In addition to traveling to the Great Khan to offer formal submission, those
surrendering had to offer royal hostages; one can see this standard Mongolian practice
through both Armenian and Persian examples. After battle between the Mongols and the
Persian noble Rukn-ad-Din, he finally decided to submit:
[Rukn-ad-Din] sent out his son, his only one, and another brother called
Iran-Shah with a delegation of notables, officials, and leaders of his
people; while on Sunday the 29 th ofShavval [19 th of November] he came
in person before the World-King and had the good fortune of waiting upon
him. He brought all of his family and dependents (muttasilan) out of
Maimun-Diz and offered his treasures as a token of his allegiance. 8?
Another example comes from the voluntary submission of the Cilician Armenians; King
Heturn I sent his brother 5mbat to Karakorum to offer formal submission. Even though
5mbat was received graciously by M5ngke Khan, the Great Khan still demanded that the
king himself come and visit him, which he did.
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THE DIVINE MANDATE AND ITS IMPACT ON RELATIONS
It is both pertinent and important to analyze the Mongols' idea of the Divine

Mandate and how it shaped foreign relations. The Divine Mandate was the single most
important factor in shaping the relations between the Mongols and the peoples they
encountered, as it established framework that formed all relations. To understand this
framework, one must first understand the Divine Mandate, which began with the birth
story of the Mongols. Kirakos of Ganjak related this origin story as told to him:
... [The Mongols'] king was related to God, God having taken the heavens
as His share and given the earth to the Xayan, was not born of the seed of
man, but a light came from the unseen and entered through the skylight of
the house and said to his mother: 'Conceive and thou shalt give birth to a
son [who shall be] emperor of the earth ... ' This was told us by Grigor the
isxan [prince] ... who had heard it from a great man amongst the great
commanders, whose name was rutun Nuin, one day when he was
instructing young children. 88

The heavenly child was Temujin, who later acquired the honorific Chinggis Khan. It was
his and his successors' destiny to rule over all of the peoples of the world.
Some scholars debate over whether the Divine Mandate existed or not and
whether Chinggis believed in it. David Morgan argues against the existence of the Divine
Mandate during Chinggis's reign, but Reuven Amitai-Preiss argues that it was clear
Chinggis's successors did believe in it:
It might be mentioned that Temuchin's adoption of the title Chinggis
Khan, which has been translated as 'Oceanic' or 'Universal Khan,' may be
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an indication that some fonn of this ideology was current in his lifetime.
Be this as it may, it is important to note that the 'imperial idea' was later
to find repeated expression in the context of the Mamluk-Ilkhanid war. As
will be seen, this belief is found to varying degrees in the many missives
sent to the Mamluk rulers from 1260 onward. [Reuven] would suggest that
it was one of the reasons behind the ongoing war with the Mamluks ... 89
This viewpoint seemed the most plausible based on the primary evidence. There were
several examples of the Ilkhans using the Mongol origin story as ruling justification in
their diplomatic letters to other peoples. According to Amitai-Preiss there was an
example from the writings of Rashid aI-Din, who said that after the battle of Abulustayn
in 1277: "Abaqa [Khan] wrote to [the Mamluk Sultan] Baybars, and inter alia declared
that God had given the earth to Chinggis Khan and his descendants.,,9o
There was also numismatic evidence that points to the Ilkhans' belief in the
Divine Mandate concept. These statements of global imperial rule were stamped on coins
manufactured in the Ilkhanate during several different reigns. On some of Abaqa Khan's
coins (the second Ilkhan) one finds such titles as: 'lord of the world (padishah-i alam)'
and 'ruler of the necks of the nations (malik riqab al-umam). ,91
Additionally, it seemed that other peoples believed in some interpretation of the
Divine Mandate, which can be seen in Annenian and Persian texts. It was believed that
the Mongols had divine support and/or they were used as a punishment for sins. The
Annenians certainly saw the Mongols as divine punishment as explained by Grigor:
Thus was accomplished what God had threatened, speaking through his
prophet. '[Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon] is a cup of gold in my hand, and
to whomsoever I wish I shall give to drink of it.' Thus this wild <and
bestial> folk not only once brought the cup, but also the dregs ofbittemess
upon us, because of our many and varied sins, which continually roused
the anger of the Creator our God at our deeds. Wherefore the Lord roused
89
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them in his anger as a lesson to us, because we had not kept his
commandments. 92
Grigor further related that: "The angel ... named their chi ef rayan, whom they
called Cankez rayan [Chinggis Khan] or Cankez Xan. The angel bade them rule over
many countries and districts, and to multiply without limit and in countless numbers,
which also came to pass.,,93 If an angel from God had appeared to the Mongols as Grigor
described, then the Armenians must have had some concept of the Divine Mandate and
its requirement for the Mongols to rule the world. In addition to prophetic writings and
stories, many different peoples (usually sedentary) believed in the Chinggisid claims to
divine support because these claims were underscored by the speed and success of
Mongol military campaigns. According to Anne Broadbridge, only a dynasty supported
by God could conquer so much so fast. These divine concepts continued from Chinggis
to his successor Ogedei and helped to inspire the conquests of the 1230s and 1240s. 94
Broadbridge's argument appeared to be the most plausible in helping to explain how
sedentary peoples may have believed in divine support to the Mongols.
The Divine Mandate shaped relations by establishing a rigid framework with the
Mongols always being on top of the ruling hierarchy. Mongol decision-making was also
shaped by the Divine Mandate; policies were geared toward military conquest. 95
Therefore, any relationship could only be 'the conqueror and the conquered,' or as
enemies.
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This 'conqueror or conquered' mentality can be seen in the terminology used in
the primary sources:
Those who totally submitted were el (if), which literally meant 'to be at
peace or in harmony,' but really connoted the state of unconditional
loyalty to the Mongols. On the other hand, all those who resisted the
Mongols and refused to submit were bulgha (literally 'to be in a confused
or disordered state') or yaghi ('enemy'); both terms expressed the state of
being 'unsubmitted' or 'rebellious' and thus being at war with the
Mongols. There was no intermediate state and those who resisted were to
be annihilated accordingly. 96
Even some of the primary source authors thought in this binary fashion. Grigor explained
the Mongol conquest of Armenia in these terms: "When this wild <and bestial> folk [the
Mongols] learned that it was the will of God to rule ... upon the earth, thereupon they
gathered their troops and attacked the Persians.'.97
After their enemy submitted, the Mongols demanded benefits that propelled their
conquests, such as the provisioning of its armies, the acquisition of more military forces,
and the establishment of a loyal and stable government in the area. For a Mongol vassal,
these conditions were non-negotiable: accept them or be killed. Even those standard
benefits the Mongols offered to their new vassals had a military advantage built in for the
Mongols. The Mongols primarily offered military protection to their new vassal and on
the surface this would seem like a negative for the Mongols since it would pull Mongol
forces away from future campaigns of conquest. But the Mongols needed to ensure the
stability of their conquered regions so that they would remain under Mongol control and
continue to supply the Ilkhan's armies with supplies and men.
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Further concessions, such as the exemption from taxation of the Armenian
Church, also helped to reestablish stability in the area, as well as gaining local support
from the Church. The return of lands to the Armenian nobles also engendered loyalty and
stability. Local control also meant that local troops could be used as the bulk of defensive
forces (although some Mongols remained as mentioned earlier). The Mongols could then
send the majority of their warriors to the front. This was of especial importance during
the Mamluk-Ilkhanid conflict, as the Mongol horse archer was the most effective weapon
against the Mamluks' own horse archers and heavier cavalry.
Clearly the Mongols shaped their policies and offered benefits according to their
pursuit of the Divine Mandate and as such, the vast majority of benefits conferred upon
their vassal would also benefit the Mongols. But how did the Divine Mandate shape and
impact relations between the Mongols and the Mamluks? How could the Mongols enact a
'conqueror's policy' when they had not yet conquered their enemy, the Mamluks? From
the beginning of their relationship, the Mongols aggressively demanded the submission
of the Mamluks. This stance is clearly represented in the diplomatic letters exchanged
between multiple Ilkhans and the Sultans. In 1260, Hiilegii sent envoys to Egypt, bringing
a letter demanding submission. The letter contained verses from the Koran and was
couched in Islamic terms, but the message was clearly Mongol, submit or die and the
Mongols possess the divinely given right to rule the world.
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The Mongols continued to demand submission, even after their defeat at Ayn
lalut, which they viewed as a temporary setback. According to Robert Irwin, Ayn lalut
had no immediate and significant negative impact on the Mongols' war-making abilities;
they were able to mount military campaigns in the following years: 1261, 1280, 1299,
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1301, and 1303.99 Amitai-Preiss concurred that Ayn Jalut was only an 'interim victory'
for the Mamluks. As he pointed out, the Mongol army defeated there was only a fraction
of the Ilkhanate's total forces. 100 Based on this evidence, it is clear that Irwin's analysis is
the most plausible concerning the impact of Ayn Jalut.
Another aspect of the Divine Mandate impacted Mamluk-Ilkhanid relations much
more than the demand for submission. The Divine Mandate inherently conveyed two
important ideas: the first was that the Mongols were commanded by God (Tenggri) to
conquer the world. If they pursued this policy, the Mongols were following the plan and
will of God. Broadbridge's interpretation of the Divine Mandate stated that the Mongols
were conquerors because God had commanded them to do so. Therefore, the Mongols, by
their actions, were following the will of God. If anyone resisted the Mongols, they were
also resisting God's will. As such, these resistors were unbelievers and must therefore be
punished. Broadbridge's summation: In obedience to the will of the Enduring Sky
(Tenggri), members of Chinggis's imperial or 'golden' family attempted to impose
universal Chinggisid rule on the world through military campaigns. Any independent
ruler intent on retaining his independence was a rebel against the golden family and the
Enduring Sky. Merciless slaughter of such rebels was necessary and good, since it
implemented divine will and provided an object lesson to other would-be rebels. 101
The Mamluks were a shining example of being obstructors to the Mongol right to
rule the world. After his conversion to Islam in 1295, the Ilkhan Ghazan (r. 1295 to 1304)
sent a series ofletters to the Mamluk Sultan Nasir [aI-Din] Muhammad b. Qalawun
(second reign 1299-1309) bragging about his own Islamic piety, but more importantly,
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offering a more subtle demand for surrender. According to Thomas Raff, Ghazan
considered his letter a warning to the Mamluks to surrender and his messengers were the
harbingers of this warning. 102 Furthermore, Ghazan displayed his commitment to the
belief that the Mongols held God's favor and were doing God's will when he, according
to Raff, accused the Sultan Qalawun of" 'persistence in aberration' as well as obstinacy
to God and obstinacy to us [Mongols];' Nasir ad-Din's [Qalawun's] soldiers 'wage war
against God,' they' give open battle to God by acts of rebellion.' He therefore advises the
Mamluks to 'put the affair in (the correct!) order. ",103 When Ghazan referred to the
correct order, he was referring to the correct world order in which the Mongols ruled the
world and the Mamluks were in their rightful lowly place as slaves. The Mamluks were
going against God and were considered rebels because they were interfering with God's
plan to see the Mongols as the rightful rulers of the world. Clearly, Ghazan still believed
and utilized all of the major aspects of the Divine Mandate, especially in his dealings
with the Mamluks.
The second important concept that arose from the Divine Mandate was that a
hierarchical structure existed in the world. It can also be interpreted that God established
this hierarchical order since He sought to make the Mongols the rulers of the world. This
sense of hierarchy was also present in the Mongols' nomadic societal structure, thus it
was a concept familiar to them (as it was to most peoples during this time). The policies
pursued by Chinggis Khan clearly showed the Mongols' adherence to a hierarchical
system. During his conquests to unify the nomadic tribes, Chinggis instituted a policy in
which defeated nomads and other Mongols were enslaved and incorporated into a
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hereditary system of slavery (Otegii boghul). The system was meant to destroy any tribal
power and connections left after his conquests, as well humiliating the defeated tribes. 104
This tactic was especially effective in nomadic societies because to the Mongols slavery
was the condition of lesser peoples.
The Mamluks insulted and stood in the face of these two principles. The
Mamluks, both in definition and practice, were a slave caste, the lowest of the low on the
social hierarchy. Yet, there they stood acting in positions of authority, fighting on the
battlefield in elite units, and even ruling as sultan! These facts alone were insults to the
Mongols (and Armenians) as it went against everything they believed in and lived by. !Os
But just as importantly, the Mamluks had the audacity to openly and vehemently resist
the Mongols. Now they were seen as rebels and unbelievers who could not accept God's
will that they submit and be ruled by the Mongols. The Mamluks' continued resistance
and victories were slowly working to prove the Divine Mandate wrong. This was surely
even greater motivation for the Mongols to defeat the Mamluks.

104
105

Broadbridge, Kingship & Ideology, l3.
Ibid. l3.

39

THE MONGOLS AND ARMENIANS
This section will examine the primary evidence (available in English translation)
relating to the interactions and links between the Ilkhanid Mongols and the kingdom of
Cilician Armenia and Greater Armenia. In the instances where the word' Armenians' is
used, this is referring to all Armenians, both those from Cilicia and those from Greater
Armenia. Distinctions will be made between the two groups when appropriate. This
section will ultimately argue that based on the analysis of primary and secondary
literature, the negative consequences of the Mongol-Armenian alliance greatly
overshadowed the benefits, ultimately stating that the Armenians' alliance with the
Ilkhanid Mongols was primarily detrimental to the Armenians. This conclusion flies in
the face of the standard expectation that an alliance would prove mainly beneficial for the
parties involved. This type of expectation certainly can apply to an alliance with the
Mongols, who at the beginning of the period under study, were the most successful and
powerful force in Asia and were poised for further triumphant conquests.
This section will begin with a summary of the submissions of the Armenians and
an explanation of their specific terms of surrender, their status as a subject or vassal state,
and the benefits a vassal could receive from the Mongols. Next, there will be an analysis
of the actual benefits the Armenians received, both those they actively pursued and those
conferred by the terms of submission. The focus will then shift to analyzing the negative
effects the Armenians experienced from their Mongol alliance. These negative effects are
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divided into subtopics: first, those negative effects that occurred because of a failure on
the Mongols' part; second, those negative effects that resulted from the Armenians
seeking to fulfill Mongol demands; and third, those negative effects that resulted from the
Armenians not fulfilling their obligations to the Mongols.
By the mid-thirteenth century the Mongols looked like an invincible military
machine and many in their path submitted to their superior force. Such a relationship
could have benefits for the vassal. After the initial shock of submission, the Armenians
began to hope they would earn significant benefits from their relationship with the
Mongols. For the Cilician Armenians, the very real threat of the Mongols was enough to
procure their submission. Submission was seen as a wiser decision, in that the Mongols
would hopefully not invade Cilician Armenia and devastate the country. Hetum I's
submission had the immediate desired effect; the country was spared. But it is unclear
whether Hetum really knew all of the obligations required of a Mongol vassal. If he had,
would he have still chosen submission? Presumably, he would have still surrendered
because the destruction of Cilician Armenia was a much more immediate and measurable
consequence than the more attrition-like loss of men and resources required by the
Mongols. Submission was also the best course because the Mongols were the most
powerful and immediate threat to the Cilician Armenians at that time. The Cilician
Armenians' neighbor, the Sultanate of Rum, had just fallen to the Mongols and the
Cilician Armenians had not yet directly encountered the other powerful regional player,
the Egyptian Mamluks.
The circumstances around the surrender of the princes of Greater Armenia were
quite different. In this case, the nobles resisted the Mongols, but failed. Hence, this
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established a true 'conqueror, conquered' relationship. The Greater Armenian princes
surrendered individually in order to preserve what little they had left. Some of the
benefits of surrender were clearer immediately to the Greater Armenian princes because
it was conveyed to them that if they surrendered the Mongols would return their lands to
them. One such example was the Armenian Prince Vahram of Gag; when he learned of
the possibility for clemency, he commanded the city of Samkor, which belonged to him,
to surrender to the Mongols. In fact, he forbade the city to resist at all.I06
It was clear that both the Cilician Armenians and the Greater Armenian princes
had little choice in surrendering, but why did the Armenians choose to stay allied with the
Mongols? Presumably, the Mongols were seen as a safer political bet than, say, the
Mamluks. During this time, the Mongols looked as though they would continue their
conquests; they certainly had proven their prowess by conquering Armenia, and the
Armenians had certainly heard of the Mongols' other conquests. Some of the Armenians'
decisions in staying allied with the Mongols can be partially explained by utilizing a
phrase called 'Mongol Prestige,' which was coined by Marshall Hodgson.! 07 He
developed this phrase as one way of explaining the impact of Mongol ideology on the
outside world. 'Mongol Prestige' was when non-Mongol peoples expressed awe and
respect for Mongol military might. This awe then influenced the political actions of these
non-Mongol peoples because they would make appeals to the greatness of Mongol
military might. J08 Taking 'Mongol Prestige' into account, the most plausible reason the
Armenians stayed allied with the Mongols was largely because of the Mongols' military
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strength. The Armenians thought they would be protected while avoiding further Mongol
devastation.
Secondly, the Mongols were the most immediate threat to the Armenians, so in
order to preserve themselves, the Armenians needed to submit to the Mongols. There
were no strong peoples around them to help them ward off the Mongols; no other country
could really help them, especially as the Armenians helped the Mongols subdue their
neighbors, i.e. Rum. Also, once the Armenians began to help the Mongols in their
military campaigns in the surrounding area, they were seen as enemies by the
neighboring peoples, thus burning any future possibilities for 10caVregional alliances.
Thirdly, Armenian religious thought played a role in continuing the Mongol
alliance. The Armenians believed that it was God's will that the Armenians should be
conquered by the Mongols and that the Mongols were militarily successful because they
had God's favor. The Mongols' victories confIrmed to the Armenians that God supported
the Mongols, thus the Armenians should support God's Chosen. This belief became
prominent in the Armenian literature of the period and was used to explain Mongol
success and the beginning of the Armenian-Mongol alliance. Whether the viewpoint of
these Armenian authors truly represented the belief of their people is unclear. It was
possible that the Armenian authors used such rationale as a coping mechanism in dealing
with the Mongol conquest of their country; as a way of understanding why such a
catastrophic event would happen, or why God would allow such an event to happen. It is
unclear if this was the case, but certainly is a viable reaction to trauma.
Either way, the Armenians showed their 'support' for the Mongols and believed
they were their best bet by expressing and exalting divine favor. Grigor of Akner
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described the development of this belief in the Mongols' divine support: " ... when the
wise princes of Armenia and Georgia realized that God had given power and victory to
[the Mongols] to take our lands, they then became reconciled, and became obedient to the
Tatars ... "I09 The Mongols' military successes convinced the Armenians that God favored
the Mongols, therefore the Armenians believed that the Mongols were the strongest
power in the area. The Armenians also believed they could count on their protection.
Very few people could have imagined the Mongols' defeat at Ayn Jalut at the hands of
the Mamluks only a few years later. Even when seen as a punishment for their sins, it was
still the safe bet to side with those chosen by God to act as his vessel, those God showed
favor to.
Another form of protection the Mongols offered was their showing of support for
one particular ruler in any given area. Earning the Mongols' support meant that a ruler
secured his throne and had a ready made security force in times of rebellion against his
rule. The Mongols' chosen ruler showed his loyalty to the Mongols by abiding by the
terms of submission, but also by portraying himself as a conservative protector of
Chinggisid heritage through marrying a Chinggisid princess, ruling in the name of the
Chinggisids, and swearing to uphold the Yasa (the legal code of the Mongols set forth by
Chinggis Khan).IIO
Even some Persians believed in Mongol superiority and assumed the Mongols
would continue to be victorious. According to Juwayni:
The truth of God's secret intent by the rise ofChingiz-Khan has become
clear and the benefit afforded by the passing of dominion and sovereignty
to the World-Emperor Mengti Qa'an [Mongke Khan] plain to see. By this
famous victory the keys of the lands of the world are placed ready for use
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in the hands of the [Mongols'] power, and the bolts of the remaining
countries of the climes ... are now undone. III

Benefits of Mongol Allegiance
First and foremost, the Mongols offered military protection for their vassals. It
was within Mongol interests to protect those who they had recently conquered. These
conquered peoples would no longer have the capacity to defend themselves as the
Mongols would have destroyed any immediate military threats. One such example can be
gleaned from the Mongols' treatment of the Greater Armenian princes. The Mongols
demanded that the princes destroy their mountain strongholds and then left Mongol
troops in place to protect these areas while further Mongol forces were called upon to
subjugate the area. According to Grigor of Akner, after the Armenian and Georgian
princes surrendered to the Mongols, the Mongols ceased their destructive campaign "but
they left a captain, rara Buya (Qara Buqa) by name, to demolish all of the strongholds
which had been conquered. They destroyed even to the foundations the impregnable forts
built by the Arabs at a great cost. This all came to pass.,,112 It was also important for the
Mongols to protect the numerous assets their conquered regions provided. This need for
immediate security can be seen in the case of Rukn ad-Din, who submitted to Hiilegii
during the I11illan's initial reconquest of Persia. Once Rukn ad-Din submitted, all of his
possessions were placed under Mongol control; his army was divided up among Hulegii's

emirs and he had to accompany the I1lillan to the royal ordu in Hamadan. Hiilegii sent
elchis to fetch the remaining enemy commanders, while his Mongol forces assessed the
treasuries in the captured castles, and guarded the enemy castles until larger Mongol
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forces could arrive. I 13 This proposal for immediate security in the aftermath of Mongol
conquest surely seemed enticing to those who wished for the violence to end and to save
what little they had left.
As a result of their administrative outlook, which placed primary emphasis on
proper, loyal service above all else, the Mongols maintained an empire of religious
tolerance. This was certainly seen as a benefit to the conquered peoples who were
relieved that they could contiue their native religions. Within the Ilkhanate's
administration, positions of power were held by Christians, Muslims, Jews, and pagans.
Some of the most prominent contemporary scholars found patronage at the court of the
Ilkhanate, including many authors whose works have survived to inform historians on
this period. One such example was the Muslim writer Nasir aI-Din Tusi, who "was
quickly pardoned and honored despite his history with the hated Ismailis ... Tusi was
almost immediately installed in a place of honour and power in Hiilegu's court ... One
of. .. [Tusi' s] first tasks was the establishment of his seat of learning in Maragheh
containing his famous library and observatory, a centre for an international cast of
academics, clerics and scholars ... ,,114 Bar Hebraeus also found sanctuary in Maragheh
and utilized its great places of learning. I IS
Hiilegii was keen to utilize all of the local talent he could in the running of his
new empire. The biographer of Ghazan Khan, Rashid aI-Din, related the treatment of his
own relatives, who had honorably served the previous Persian regime. According to
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George Lane, Rashid al-Din's "own relatives were recognized for their own abilities and
were given refuge after the fall of Alamut.,,116 In addition:
The thinker and Shia divine, Ibn Tawus, together with other clerics and
scholars were all spared the massacres of Baghdad and like the Caucasus's
leading clerics and academics, were soon co-opted into Htilegii's circle of
apparent admirers .... Rashid aI-Din readily acknowledges Hulegii's keen
interest in science and the disputations and discussions of philosophers
and scholars and his generous allocation of pensions and stipends to these
learned 'hangers' on.'1l7
Therefore, Hiilegu and his successors were more concerned with utilizing the resources at
hand than instituting religious or political persecution.
Service to the Mongols could also provide great political benefits to their vassals.
The Mongols conferred political power to their most valued vassals by favoring certain
houses over others, either through the granting of positions or the redistribution of lands
from less favored vassals to the valued. In the case of Greater Armenia, political power
granted from the Mongols allowed certain Armenian houses to capitalize on their
positions, even after the fall of the Ilkhanate. Such an example was Prosh Khaghbakian,
who strengthened the position of his house (later known as the Proshians) through his
loyalty and service. I 18
A very valuable incentive for the Mongols' vassals was the possibility of having
their lands returned to them (perhaps with some additional land). The treatment of the
Greater Armenian princes gave several such examples. According to Vardan Arewelci:
"Vahram with his son Albulay fled from place to place, until he realized that they spared
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those who submitted and willingly capitulated. Then he came and received the castles and
the province taken from them which had been [Vahram's] own patrimonial property." I 19
Bedrosian quoted Kirakos as giving the following information on Prince Awag's
surrender to Chormaghan, the Mongol general for Armenian lands:
[Chormaghan] further ordered all of his troops not to fight with the
fortresses and cities under Awag's domination. And great ease came about
in his [Awag] land and many captives among the azats were freed because
of him. And [Chormaghan] gave him all of his land and more besides and
established unbreakable friendship with him. Taking Awag and all his
troops, [Chormaghan] marched against the city of Ani. 120
In most instances, when a prince surrendered, the Mongol commander ordered the
destruction of all the prince's lands to cease immediately, thus sparing him further
damage (a great benefit in itself). One can see the immediate operation of the Mongol
terms of submission in Kirakos' description; Awag received his lands back and in return
went on campaign with Chormaghan immediately against Ani.
Certainly the most important benefit the Mongols conferred to their vassals was
the extension of a pardon for all the past transgressions the vassals had committed against
the Mongols. These transgressions could be direct military opposition, simply being on
the losing side, or not following Mongol demands. Kirakos again described the process of
Prince Awag's submission. After his initial submission, Awag then visited the Khan in
Karakorum. Many other Armenian princes were at court offering submission as well.
These men included " ... Sahnsah, son of Zakare; prince Vahram and his son Albula;
Hasan called Jalal, prince of the Xacen area, and many others. The Tatars gave to each
one control over his lands and for the time being, a pardon.,,121 A pardon given by the
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Khan meant that the Mongols would cease military operations against the new vassal and
he would not longer be considered an enemy of the Mongols.
Of great importance to warrior aristocracies was the opportunity to gain and prove
martial prowess. They did this both to secure the loyalty of their own people and earn the
respect of their enemies and possible allies. The Annenians were such warriors and "the
Caucasian Christians and the Annenians of Lesser Annenia [Cilician Annenia] willingly
swelled the ranks of the conquering [Ilkhanid] army and were energetic in proving
themselves brave and worthy allies.,,122 According to Bedrosian, Grigor of Akner stated:
"Htilegii Khan greatly loved the Annenian and Georgian forces because of the extreme
bravery which they displayed before him in all battles. Therefore he called them bahaturs
[heroes, champions]. He selected the young and handsome sons of the great princes of
Annenia and Georgia and appointed them as his guards.,,123
Although the Greater Annenian submissions were for the most part forced by
violence or the threat of violence, the Annenian princes quickly looked for what benefits
they could glean from this subservient status to the Mongols. The princes' main aim was
to increase their political power at the expense of other princes. This political rivalry
allowed the Mongols easily to keep the Annenians and Georgian families divided. 124 It
was Mongol policy that before conquering a particular area, the area was always divided
up to be taken by lots among their generals. The surrendered naxarars then became
clients of the particular Mongol general conquering that territory. This standard Mongol
policy worked well in creating and perpetuating divisions among the Annenian nobility.
An example of the Mongol policy of pitting Annenian political ambitions against one
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another was in the 1260s and 1270s, when the Mongols furthered the territorial and
political ambitions of the Orbelians and the ArcrunidIMahkanaberdelis at the expense of
the Zakarids and the Georgian Bagratids. 125 Obviously, the ArcrunidIMahkanaberdelis
families benefited from their Mongol alliance (but such Mongol favor vacillated).
Another way in which some Annenians benefited from their Mongol alliance was
through the conquest of other Annenians. Beside the Mongols they attacked Annenian
cities that had not surrendered. They received plunder and possibly land. One such
example came from the Mongol conquests in the 1230s and 1240s. It is pertinent because
the Mongols pursued very similar policies in the 1250s and the Annenian princes acted in
a similar fashion:
Then the great and independent princes of Georgia ... became tributary to
them, willingly or unwillingly. They gave freely all of the tribute
demanded ... They themselves, according to their resources and ability,
came with their cavalry with them (the Tatars) on raids, and took the
unconquered towns and castles, plundering and taking captives. They
killed without mercy men and women, priests and monks, making slaves,
taking the deacons as their slaves, and plundering the churches of the
Christians without fear .... 126

This type of military assistance also extended to wars beyond the Annenian border.
Grigor of Akner stated that a "mustering of the people of the archers with the Annenian
and Georgian princes [occurred], and they attacked the country of Rum with a countless
multitude.,,127
In reaction to the Annenian princes' efforts toward political gains, the Mongols
bestowed several different benefits. These measures began after 1256, the year HUlegii
founded the Ilkhanate. The Mongols attempted to incorporate certain prominent naxarars
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into their own court and administration. They further bound the naxarars through
marriage, giving each a Mongol wife. They also granted certain Armenian territories inju
status, i.e. independent authority on one's own land. This new status broke the princes
away from the Georgian crown to the benefit of the Mongols and the Armenian princes,
who had chomped at the bit to free themselves from the Georgian regime. 5mbat
Orbelian received inju status in 1252; Hasan Jalal received it in 1257; and Sarqis Jaqeli in

1273.128 Some Cilician Armenian nobles were treated in a similar fashion. Mongke Khan
made "him [Smbat Sparapet] a vassal and gave him a great iariax, a golden tablet, and a
real Tatar queen with a crown, which for them was a great honor. To whomsoever they
honor and esteem they give a wife from their women of station. Thus they were giving
great honor to the Armenian general.,,129 According to Vardan Arewelci, Hiilegii further
trusted the Armenians by using Armenian merchants as emissaries. 130
The princes of Greater Armenia and the king of Cilician Armenia both sought
territorial gains, a chief desire of all rulers. According to Dashdondog, the Armenian
chronicler Heturn Patmich described the following event. After the capture of Syria and
Palestine in 1260, the Mongols gave King Hetum I ofCilician Armenia territory in
western Cilicia along with several fortresses that had been taken by the Muslims. King
Heturn I also expanded his territories on the Cappadocian, Mesopotamian, and Syrian
borders where the trade routes passed and his son-in-law Bohemond VI of Antioch
received the port of Latakia. 131 Grigor explained that: "[Hiilegu] began to rebuild the
devastated places, and from each inhabited village he selected householders, one from the
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small, and two or three from the large villages, and he called them iam, and sent them to
all of the destroyed places to undertake rebuilding. They paid no taxes at all, but gave
only bread and broth for Tatar travelers. He established by such ordinances the throne of
his Khanate ... ,,132
Just as common as desire for land, the Armenians also sought material wealth
from gaining economic routes and booty from military campaigns. The Armenian
naxarars and common soldiers received booty from their Mongol campaigns. This was a

large benefit for the Armenians in their alliance with the Mongols. They were especially
enriched after the sacking of the Sultanate of Rum and when Awag helped sack Ani he
looted its churches. 133 Bedrosian supplied a passage from the Georgian chronicle the
History of Kartli: "The Georgians and Tatars swelled up with all sorts of treasures: gold

and silver, gold and silver cups and bowls, extraordinary cloths and clothing and so many
horses, asses and camels that it is impossible to count them.,,134 The Armenians also
gained many religious treasures, including the right hand of Saint Bartholomew. After a
siege of three years the Mongols "took the City of Martyrs [Mayyafariqin], where the
Armenian forces which were with the Tatars found many relics of the saints and brought
them to their country.,,135
Christianity played an important role in shaping Armenian-Mongol relations, both
in actual events and how they interpreted later. The Armenians wanted a strong ally in
protecting and promoting Christianity and it seems that they measured a ruler's value on
his support of their faith:
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Since they [Hetum and his advisors] had first seen Bacu, the commander
of the Tatar army, and had confirmed a pact of friendship and submission,
then after this they sent the brother of the King, the general of Armenia,
Baron 5mbat to Sayin ran [Monkge Khan], who had been set on the
throne ofCankez ran [Chinggis Khan]. He went with the blessing of God
and saw Sayin ran, who was very pro-Christian and virtue-loving.
Because of this his people called him Sayin ran, which in their language
means the good and fine ran.136

A showing of support for Christianity certainly also helped in their negotiations, although
in this quote Grigor flipped the situation by the Khan showing gratitude for the
Armenians being Christian. "On seeing the Armenian general [Smbat], Sayin ran
[Mongke Khan] rejoiced much because of the Christian faith but even more because of
the firm, manly, and wise words which ... Smbat spoke before him.,,137
The Armenians needed to see that their military allies supported the Christian
faith. Grigor of Akner praised Hiilegli numerous times in his support of Christianity.
Grigor and Vardan both related: "Hulawu Khan was very good, loving Christians, the
church, and priests. Likewise his blessed wife Tawvus Xatun, who was good in every
way, and was compassionate to the poor and needy. She very much loved all Christians,
Armenians and Syrians, so that her tent was a church, and a sounder traveled with her,
and many Armenian and Syrian priests.,,138 Grigor went further in his description:
"Hulawu ran [Hiilegli Khan] himself was a great mind and great soul, just, and quite
learned. He was a great shedder of blood, but he slew only the wicked and his enemies,
and not the good or righteous. He loved the Christian folk more than the infidels.,,139
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Grigor of Akner described a gathering between Hetum I and his princes, priests,
and nobles in which Heturn praised the service of his son Toros, who was killed in battle
against the Mamluks. Heturn also mentioned the service of horsemen, which most likely
referred to the Mongols: "Just as such a number of horsemen strove on behalf of the
Christians, and became worthy of heavenly crowns, so also did my sons. Toros strove
valiantly for the Christians and contended for the Christians.,,14o
Heturn I, king of Cilician Armenia, demanded that the Mongols restore the Holy
Land to Christian hands. According to Heturn Patmich, Heturn I expressed his desire both
to Mongke Khan at Karakorum in 1253/54 and then to Hiilegii at Maragheh in 1258. 141
Hetum I and his successors also made appeals to the Christian West to help liberate the
Holy Land. The Armenians hoped that the Western powers "would join forces with
[Armenia's] powerful and some time Christian Tatar [Mongol] overlords and assist in
their delivery of the 'Holy Land' to their righteous [Armenian] safe keeping. They alone
among these thirteenth-century would-be allies appeared to whole-heartedly endorse the
concept of an all out united war to rid Syria and Egypt of the infidel Muslims.,,142
The Armenians sought to improve the standing of their Christian Church by
appealing to the Ilkhans, asking for the churches to be exempt from Mongol taxes.
According to Grigor of Akner, the Cilician Armenians received such benefits. After the
return of 5mbat from Karakorum, the Mongols ordered Heturn to go and see Mongke
Khan: "The pious King Hetum, seeing his brother Baron 5mbat thus favored with such an
honor, and esteemed by the Khan, rejoiced greatly. He rejoiced even more because of the
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documents regarding the freeing from taxes of our land and our monasteries, and of all
Christians.,,143
According to the Armenian chronicler Kirakos, King Hetum I drafted a list of
appeals, which he presented to the Great Khan, upon offering his submission. In this list
Hetum I asked for the Great Khan to convert to Christianity and be baptized, as well as
allow the establishment of Christian churches in all Mongol lands and that the Armenians
be freed from all taxes. He also demanded that Mongke Khan free the Holy Land from
the Mamluks and give the Christians jurisdiction there. Other requests of a less religious
nature included that the Mongols suppress the Caliph of Baghdad, that the Mongols offer
the Armenians help in times of need, and that all lands of the Armenians taken by the
Mamluks be given back to the Armenians. 144
Hetum also asked for the Armenian Church to receive exemptions from taxes.
According to Grigor, Hetum was successful in his petitioning and described his trip in
this manner:
The pious King of the Armenians, Hetum, heard that Hulawu fan [HUlegU
Khan] had been enthroned, and that he was so friendly and pro-Christian;
then the Armenian King himself also went to the east with many gifts. He
saw Hulawu fan, and when the Khan saw the King of Armenia he liked
him very much and honored him. He wrote a second charter (lit., freedom)
for his kingdom, but more especially for the churches and ecclesiastics,
and for all the Christians of the country. With such honor and great wealth
he dispatched the King of the Armenians to his country.145

In Greater Armenia, some areas were more successful in gaining exemptions from
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(r. 1284-1291) made a decree that eliminated 150 Armenian monasteries and convents
from the royal tax registry. This decree was in actuality a confirmation of an earlier
decree in which Tarsaich Orbelian succeeded in securing these tax exemptions. 146
In his list of petitions, Hetum also asked the Ilkhan to spare the Christian
communities in all of the conquered cities. When Baghdad was captured, the Christians
who lived there were spared by the invading Mongols, apparently by the goodwill and
intervention ofHUlegii's Christian wife, Toluz Khatun. According to Vardan: "Hulawu
[Htilegii] went to the land of Mesopotamia and captured those cities and provinces ... the
patriarch of Armenia, the Catholicos, came to him, blessed him and was befriended by
him. When he took all the country of Sam [Syria], there was also with him our crowned
[King] Hetum who freed from death the Christians, ecclesiastics and laymen, in every
place ... ,,147 It was clear in both the Armenian and Arabic sources that the Mongols
attempted such a policy, but it was not uniformly enforced and it experienced mixed
success.

Harmful Effects of Mongol Allegiance
Unfortunately for the Armenians, there were numerous risks in their Ilkhanid
alliance, many of which did not transform into benefits. These losses naturally reflected
negatively on the Armenian-Ilkhanid alliance and served as a means in determining
whether the Ilkhanid alliance was ultimately beneficial or not for the Armenians, both in
Cilicia and Greater Armenia. For the Kingdom ofCilician Armenia, the most significant
negative impact that resulted from their Ilkhanid alliance was that the alliance brought
them into direct contact with the Egyptian Mamluks, who quickly became a fierce
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enemy. In fact, it would be the Mamluks who would ultimately destroy the Kingdom of
Cilician Annenia in 1375 (the Ilkhanate had already collapsed in 1335). The Mamluks
attacked the Annenians during lags in their conflicts with the Ilkhanid Mongols and
Crusaders; they often attacked in retribution for the Armenian raids into northern Syria,
land the Mamluks considered theirs.
The military threat of the Mamluks would not have been a problem if the Cilician
Annenians had the consistent and strong military support of their Ilkhanid ally.
Unfortunately this was not the case. The Ilkhanid Mongols were usually so engrossed
with wars against the other branches of the Chinggisid family that they could not come to
the aid of the Armenians. The Armenians and Georgians were in dire need of military
assistance and protection against the Mongol rebel Teguder, who had challenged the
ascension of Abaqa to the throne of the Ilkhanate and was ravaging the Annenian
countryside and "the exactions of this lawless chieftain [Teguder] weighed upon the
eastern monasteries. Learning of this the Annenian and Georgian princes went together
to Abaya ran [Abaqa Khan] and cast their swords before the Khan and said 'Either give
Tagudar [Teguder] and his troops into our hands, or kill us in front of you, so as not to
see such outrages as they are doing to our churches and to the clergy. ",148
Not only was it impossible for the Mongols to send aid to the Annenians against
their enemies, it seemed impossible for the Mongols to defeat Teguder without the
Armenians' aid (or at least this is how Grigor painted the picture). The Armenians and
Georgians were continually pulled into these civil wars and forced to fight for the Ilkhan:
He [Abaqa] gave the [Great] Khan's own seal into the hands ofSiramun
[Mongol commander]. Likewise he ordered the Annenian and Georgian
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forces to go themselves in full strength against Tagudar [Teguder], and
mercilessly to slay his forces ... take all of his things, and to bring Tagudar
himself alive before him [Abaqa]. Hearing this the Armenian and
Georgian troops were very happy at the freeing of their land from the evil
deeds of Tagudar. They bravely mustered themselves for war, likewise
Siramun, the son ofCawrmayan [Chormaghan], who was very well
disposed towards the Christians. Taking the Khan's standard and one
hundred thousand troops, he suddenly fell on Tagudar and mercilessly
slaughtered his troops. They took all of his treasure, and himself with
seven hundred men whom they brought to the Khan. 149
This particular piece of evidence also showed that the Mongols were able to eventually
give their military protection to the Armenians against the Mongol rebel Teguder.
Despite this example, overall it seemed that the Armenians came to the aid of the
Mongols much more than the Mongols aided them.
The greatest example of this lack of support and its dire consequences came when
King Hetum I conducted raids into northern Syria, taking booty from the areas around
Aleppo in 1262. He conducted several more raids from 1262-64, but all were
unsuccessful. 150 He assumed he would receive Mongol support and protection and
therefore need not worry about Mamluk retribution. But when the Mamluks came to
address this grievance, the Mongols were not there to protect Hetum I and his kingdom
suffered greatly for it. As the thirteenth century progressed, the Mamluks grew stronger
and "in the last decade of the thirteenth century, their attacks intensified. In 1291, with
the fall of Acre and Tyre, the Crusaders' power in Syria-Palestine was destroyed forever,
leaving Armenia, under King Hethum II, as the last Christian bastion on the Asiatic
mainland, supporting and supported by CypruS.,,151
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Grigor stated that Hetum I refused to cooperate with the Mamluks because he
believed he had the support of his nobles. He never mentioned the Mongols or the
expectation of their support:
Then the infidel and ferocious Sultan of Egypt came with a great force to
Damascus, and from there sent ambassadors to the King of the Armenians
in regard to some trifle which he wanted from the King. The Armenian
King did not give it; rather he answered insulting words calling him a
<dog> and a slave ... He did not make peace, but remained hostile to him
and insubordinate, knowing that his father the Baron was alive and his
princes united. 152
It must be noted that Grigor seemed to contradict himself here in his description of the

Armenians' loyalties to Hetum 1's policies. In the above quote, he stated that the princes
were united with Hetum and that he could expect their military support. But then later in
his work, Grigor blamed the Armenian defeat at the hands of the Mamluks on the
Armenian army's rebelliousness, which led to the Prince Toros's death and the capture of
Prince Lewon.
Which story to believe was less important than what the quotation below can
convey about Mongol-Armenian relations:
Then the Armenian King, when he learned of the invasion of the Turks
[Mamluks] into his country, mustered his forces and entrusted them to his
sons, the crown princes, Lewon and Toros. He himself with his small
detachment went to the Tatars [Mongols] who were sojourning between
Ablstin and Kokeson. He remained there several days, not knowing ofthe
dissensions in his army. Once he persuaded the chieftain of the Tatars to
come and aid his troops, he came back two days ahead of them. Then he
heard of the coming of the Turks and the defeat of his rebellious army,
how they betrayed his sons, the crown princes, into the hands of the infidel
wolves, and they themselves fled to their strongholds; that they (the Turks)
[Mamluks] had struck down his handsomest son the prince, Baron Toros,
from his horse in the battle. The Turks [Mamluks] had seized Baron
Lewon and many of his troops, taking them prisoners to Egypt. 153
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In the description above, the Mongols were persuaded to come to the aid of the
Armenians, but arrived too late. This attempt at least showed that the Mongols did offer
military aid to the Armenians, but to what extent and to what result cannot be known
from this evidence.
The Armenians' political reliance on the Mongols went against Armenian
interests in the vast majority of cases. One such example of the political reliance of the
Armenians on the Mongols was when Lewon, son of Return I, uncovered and dealt with a
rebellion against his accession to the Armenian throne. Grigor explained that the
Mongols allowed Lewon to imprison some of the rebels and kill others, while still "others
[Lewon] dispatched to Abaya ran [Abaqa Khan] in the east. There they imposed the
yasax [yasa] on them, and all other enemies they (the Mongols) gave into his hands, and

they ordered him either to imprison them or to kill them.,,154 Clearly political
subservience to the Mongols required that the Mongol law code, the yasa, took
precedence over any Armenian law code.
Another negative result of the Armenians' political links with the Mongols was
that the Mamluks often attacked the Mongols indirectly by attacking the Armenians.
Obviously, this tactic would have only hurt the Armenians. One such example was when
the Ilkhan Arghun sought to steal the Egyptians' profitable trade routes in the Red Sea by
constructing a naval fleet in Baghdad for this expressed purpose. In revenge, the Sultan
Qalawun raided and pillaged the Cilician Armenians in 1285. 155
The Ilkhanate's internal politics regularly went against Armenian interests. But it
was also the case that the Armenians' enemies attempted to use the Mongol political
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system to attack the Armenians. There were multiple attempts to sow distrust in the
Ilkhan's court against the Armenians. These dissenters had a strong grasp of the
Mongols' laws and sought to use the Mongols' harsh rules against the Armenians.
According to Grigor of Akner, some Armenian princes resided at the court of Abaqa
Khan and fed information back to King Hetum I on the court's politics. These princes
secretly sent back word that:
Arab amirs had become advisers and associates of the Khan. In secret they
were friendly to the Egyptians and evilly disposed to the king of the
Armenians and to all Christians. The Arab amirs had become favorites and
<advisers> of the Khan, and had written to the Sultan of Egypt in secret:
'Seek by goodwill to obtain one village from the Armenian King, and this
will be sufficient and more than enough to ruin him and his country. We
will tell and advise the Khan that the Armenian King is damaging the
whole world, and he will send horsemen to slay them all. ,156
The Mongols had conquered most of the lands the Armenian king now administered and
as such, the Armenian king was not allowed to give away land that was not his. Ifhe did
so, his action would be viewed as an act of betrayal against the Mongols and he would be
labeled as a traitor. The Mongols would then kill this traitor. The Arab amirs understood
the Mongols' strict policies and sought to use them to their benefit. If they could frame
the Armenian king as a traitor, then they could sit back and let Mongolian justice take its
course. This incident shows the destructive potential of the Mongols' political and legal
system on their vassals.
Still another negative impact on the Armenian political system was that the
alliance with the Mongols took away the Armenians' abilities to negotiate treaties. As
part of the treaty of 1285, the Mamluk Sultan Baybars demanded the surrender of key
fortresses in Cilician Armenia's possession. Hetum I did not want to give up these
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frontier holdings because he feared the anger of the Mongols, who would blame him for
having fallen under the influence of the Sultan if he gave them the fortresses the Mongols
had captured. IS7 Vardan Arewelci described how the Armenians' conflict with the
Mamluks came about:
... The Sultan of Egypt called Pntxtar [Baybars] demanded the castles
which Return, the king of Armenia, had taken with the Tatars' [Mongols']
support. When he did not give them up, notably because of his fear of the
Tatars, he was greatly enraged. Gathering a vast army ... sent it against
Cilicia ... [the Mamluks] captured the capital city Sis, the royal residence,
burned it and the churches there ... Among the killed the foremost mortally
wounded was the king's son Toros, in the flower of his youth ... [the] elder
brother [Lewon] ... had been crowned and raised to the royal throne durin~
his father's [Return's] lifetime. [Lewon] was foremost of the captives ... I 8
The Mamluks dealt massive blows to the Cilician Armenians, not only materially but also
in the disruption and destruction of the Armenian leadership. King Return I lost his
second son and heir, but more significant was the capture of his first son and primary
heir. Ris first son, Lewon, had assumed joint rule with his father Heturn by this point;
thus the Armenians truly lost one oftheir kings. Also, the fmancial and political burden
the Cilician Armenians experienced to successfully ransom Lewon surely undercut
significantly the kingdom's ability to recover from the Mamluks' devastation.
Multiple Mamluk campaigns into Cilicia crushed Armenian resistance, forcing the
Armenians to accept an embarrassing and extremely disadvantageous treaty in 1285. The
treaty was negotiated separately from the Armenians' Mongol overlords and forced the
Armenians to become vassals of the Mamluks. King Return I had to relinquish a number
of key fortresses, while his son, Lewon, was forced to sign the peace treaty during his
captivity in Egypt. The Arabic author Abd al-Zathir explained the terms ofthe ten-year
157 The Sultan also wanted to acquire less ruined frontier holdings for his trade routes and market places,
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treaty: the Cilician Armenians had to pay an annual tribute of one million dirhams. The
Armenians had to also give annually twenty-five pedigree horses, the same number in
mules, and 10,000 iron bars for horseshoes and nails. 159
After the ten-year treaty, the Mamluks, under the leadership of the Sultan AINasir Muhammad b. Qalawun (r. 1293-94,1299-1309,1310-1340), continued to exert
economic pressure on Cilician Armenia and forced them to accept tributary status. 160 The
Mamluks took advantage of the weak Armenian King Return II (r. 1295-96, 1299-1303,
1303-1307) by conducting constant raids into Cilicia. Return II sought to appease the
Egyptians with large sums of money, but this tactic failed, as did every attempt by the
Armenians to repel Mamluk attacks. In 1292, the Sultan aI-Ashraf Khalil b. Qalawun (r.
1290-93) seized Rromklay, which was the See of the Armenian Catholicos, situated on
the Euphrates River. Return II had to provide a large sum of money and hand over the
great fortress of Behest to secure the Catholicos's freedom from Egyptian captivity. 161
After the fall of Hromklay in 1292, the Ilkhan Geikhatu (r. 1291-95) came
forward and threatened the Mamluk Sultan aI-Ashraf, stating that since the Sultan sacked
Hromklay, the Mongols would retaliate by attacking Aleppo. AI-Ashraf countered by
threatening to sack Baghdad. From an analysis of Rashid aI-Din, it was not clear whether
the Ilkhan issued this threat from some sense ofloyalty to the Armenians. What was clear
was that AI-Ashrafs threat kept Geikhatu in Baghdad. In essence the Ilkhan chose to
protect Baghdad instead of coming to the aid of the Cilician Armenians. 162 It was to be
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expected that the Ilkhans would put the Ilkhanate's interests and protection before that of
the Annenians and that this example was only one of what actually occurred.
A curious event during the siege of Hromklay may show an example of the
Mongol failure to offer military aid to the Annenians. During the siege King Hetum II
attempted to relieve the city by a cunning tactic: the Annenians posed as Mongols by
wearing Mongol caps (saraqujat) and attacking the Mamluk caravans and supply trains.
This tactic proved unsuccessful once Sultan ai-Ashraf uncovered the ruse and attacked
the citadel, securing the city for the Mamluks.
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Annenian fourteenth century chronicler Nerses Palients, never explained why the
Annenians adopted this tactic. It was highly probable that the Armenians wished to
capitalize on the Mongols' threatening and fierce presence, thus forcing their enemy to
fight with more caution or hesitation. If this were true then why would the Annenians
need to dress as Mongols unless they had no Mongols with them? To achieve their
military tactic of Mongol intimidation, the Annenians would have to do it themselves.
The adoption of this tactic may also show that the Annenians greatly needed the
assistance of the Mongols, but did not receive it. Thus, this was another example of the
Mongols failing to offer military protection to the Annenians.
Mongol policy in Greater Annenia was not much different; they often failed to
offer military protection to the princes of Greater Annenia and they forbade the princes
from negotiating with other powers. It was crucial for the Mongols to aggressively
enforce the latter policy because another Chinggisid branch, the Golden Horde, interacted
with Greater Annenia and the Ilkhanate needed to ensure the Annenian princes' loyalty.
This Ilkhanid policy was detrimental to Greater Annenia because it ensured that there
163
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was always a strong enemy on the Armenians' doorstep, since the Golden Horde laid
claim to the territories of the northern Caucasus. This fact, coupled with the Ilkhanate's
inability to offer military protection, created a terrible situation for the Armenians.
Armenia and Georgia became the primary battlegrounds between the Ilkhanate and the
Golden Horde almost every year of the conflict in the second half of the thirteenth
century. According to their subject status, the Greater Armenians had to side with the
Ilkhans, which included providing provisions and troops. 164 It was entirely possible that
an alliance with the Golden Horde could have offered more benefits to the Armenians
than their present alliance with the Ilkhanate, but their alliance prevented them from
opening negotiations with the Golden Horde. It also prevented them from negotiating
peace treaties or any avenue that could stem the flow of supplies and men out of the
country or end the devastation of the land.
A great number of Armenians fought in the Mongol civil wars, as mentioned by
Grigor: "Again the messengers of Manku ran [Mongke Khan] ordered the Armenian and
Georgian forces, as well as the forces of Hulawu [HUlegii], to go and attack their armies
and to slay them mercilessly. So they did. They killed so many that the mountains and
plains stank from the bodies of the slain Tatars.,,165 These rebel Mongols were those sons
of Mongke Khan who refused to accept HUlegii's appointment as Khan in the west. The
four rebellious sons were killed and their armies defeated.
In addition to preventing autonomous treaty negotiations, the Ilkhanid alliance
brought the Armenians into political situations and negotiations that were often not
advantageous for the Armenians. This was especially the case with the Egyptian
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Mamluks. It is surprising how intimately linked these three powers could be with one
another. Grigor provided an explanation of a political arrangement made among the three
kingdoms that seemed to offer a mixed bag for the Armenians:
The King of the Armenians [Hetum I] ... sent an ambassador to the Sultan
of Egypt to learn about his son Lewon, and what the wish of the Sultan
might be, what he might give and ransom his son. The Sultan of Egypt,
Pnduxtar [Baybars] ... when he heard of the arrival of the ambassadors he
rejoiced and said, 'We should send Lewon to his father and to his
kingdom. I have a beloved comrade a prisoner with the Tatars [Mongols].
Obtain him by your own efforts. If you want to get him from the Tatars
they will not cause trouble. Take him, Syur [Sunqur al-Ashqar] 166 by
name, and take Lewon away.' 167
When considering this specific example, it had both beneficial and detrimental aspects
for the Armenians. The Armenians' connection with the Mongols allowed them to broker
the deal to secure Sunqur al-Ashqar for the Mamluks. In this case, the Armenians had
something to offer the Mamluks in exchange for Lewon:
The Armenian king at once gathering many treasures and precious things,
went to the east to Abaya ran [Abaqa Khan]. He told him all of his
complaints, what the Egyptians had done to him and his country. He also
told of the request of the Sultan regarding the captive Syur [Sunqur], but
he was unable to obtain him at once. He came back and sent his nephew,
who with the aid of God went and brought Syur the captive to our
country .... When the [Armenian] King sent to the Sultan saying, 'Syur has
been brought,' the Sultan was very happy and at once dispatched Lewon
with many presents. They (the Armenians) sent Syur with many presents.
When Baron Lewon came, the King was very happy, and the princes of
the country, as well as the monks and all Christians who were in the entire
land. 168
If the Armenians had not been connected to the Mongols, they would have had much less
to offer the Mamluks and hence, fewer possibilities for peace. On the other hand, it was
clearly detrimental to the Armenians that they could not negotiate their own treaties and
166 Sunqur al-Ashqar was called the 'hunting falcon' and was captured by the Mongols when they took
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truly be able to put their interests first. The Armenians were also at a disadvantage when
confronted by the Mamluks, because the Mamluks could and did act independently, but
the Armenians were constrained by the Mongols. They had to allow the Mongols into
their negotiations or they would be punished. They also had to rely on the Mongols
militarily, because they could not successfully prosecute any campaigns. This can be seen
from Hetum 1's failed incursions into northern Syria.
Another negative aspect of the Mongol alliance for the Armenians was the very
real threat of the Mongols themselves. If the Mongols perceived that a vassal had
betrayed them they would seek retribution. There were several examples in which the
Armenians were punished for transgressions, real or imagined. Early in their relationship
with Mongke Khan, the Armenian and Georgian princes were accused of speaking
boastful words against the Mongols saying they would beat them in battle. This was
taken as a threat and act of treachery: "Then they (the Tatars) believed the false words
and invaded our [Armenian and Georgian] country, taking as plunder all ofthe
possessions and flocks of the people. But they did not kill the population, being without
any order from the great Khan. They seized the King and all of the princes of the nation
[and brought them to the court of the Mongol chieftain to be tried].,,169 Fortunately, the
Armenian Prince Awag was able to convince the Mongols of their innocence and the
Mongols stopped their destruction of the land.
Another incident of Armenian/Georgian treachery did not end so positively.
Vardan related the following episode: "[The Mongols] murdered at the court of [HUlegit]
the Georgian general Zakare .. .in the flower of his youth .. .Indeed, they falsely accused
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him of holding back the due tax at the time when he himself went to the

COurt.,,170

Not

even high-ranking nobles were safe from Mongol punishment. In fact, these leaders were
the ones who bore the brunt of Mongol punishment and pressure. This struggle to walk a
thin line was certainly a negative consequence and stressor in the Armenians' relationship
with the Mongols.
Both Greater Armenia and Cilician Armenia experienced heavy material burdens
as a result of their alliances with the Mongols. Kirakos of Ganjak mentioned several
different taxes imposed on the princes and territories of Greater Armenia. Kirakos had
this to say on the taxation practices: "[the Mongols] began to harass them [the Armenian
princes] through taxation, by traveling to and fro, and by soldiership and even more than
this, they placed them under duress, but killed no one.,,171 One such financial burden was
a tax levied against provincial peoples for the maintenance of the yam system. The yam
was a well-maintained way station system that supported messenger riders, who
transported messages across the Mongol Empire. Kirakos further reported that artisans,
anglers, miners, and manufacturers were heavily taxed. The increased Mongol taxation in
1245-46 drove some Armenian nobles from their lands and forced them to flee to their
fortresses. Other Mongol taxes made some Caucasian nobles mortgage their estates to
pay this tax. I72 Currently, historians have not found any comparative taxation data for
Cilician Armenia.
Some Armenians had already experienced heavy taxation at the hands of the
Mongols. Grigor of Akner recounted taxes levied in 1251-52 in the 'upper districts of the
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east.' This phrase was likely referencing Greater Armenia, being east of Cilician
Armenia:
A Tatar chieftain, Ardun by name, came by the command of Manku fan
[Mongke Khan] and took a census of the eastern country for the taxes.
From this time on they were wont to tax according to the number of heads
of the people, as many were inscribed on the books, but still more they
plundered the country of the east. In one small village they counted from
thirty to fifty men all from fifteen to sixty years of age. They took sixty
aspers from each person who was counted. 173
These same tax rates (or very similar) were most likely in place when Hiilegii took power
in 1260.
The Mongols relied heavily on Greater Armenia to provide large supply trains for
the Mongol army. The Armenians provided most of the provisions for the Mongol armies
during their war with the Ismailis in 1256. 174 According to Dashdondog, if all of the food
levies were enforced, Greater Armenia would have surely faced economic crisis and
famine in 1256.175 Rashid aI-Din also stated that the Armenians were the main foodstuffs
provider to the Mongol armies. The Mongols decided to transport supplies from Armenia
to Yazd and every community in these lands had to pay food levies, the ufagh and taghar,
even when Greater Armenia faced famine in 1256. 176 The taghar was to "be collected
from each individual listed in the royal register. From such they demanded one hundred

fitrs [pounds] of grain, fifty litrs of wine, two fitrs of rice and hllSks, three sacks, two
cords, one spitak [silver coin], one arrow, let alone the other bribes; and one in every
twenty animals plus twenty spitaks.,,177 This was a great sum to be paid and it was
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unclear whether this tax was enacted on an annual or other temporal basis, or on the
command of the Illrnan.
Greater Armenia and Cilician Armenia both experienced great material
destruction of their lands and cities as a result oftheir alliances with the Mongols. Greater
Armenia was the battleground between the Ilkhanate and the Golden Horde; therefore
their lands were often ruined and their lands had not yet recovered from the two previous
Mongol invasions. Cilician Armenia experienced widespread destruction from the
numerous Mamluk raids and expeditions. All of CiIician Armenia's cities were
devastated at least once, especially the capital of Sis.
Perhaps greater than the destruction of land was the loss of human lives. The
primary sources included numerous references to the high mortality experienced by the
Armenian military and its nobility. The Caucasian forces made up a large percentage of
the Ilkhanid army through most of the Armenian-Ilkhanid alliance. This would have been
a large drain on Caucasian society. One such example was that more than one third of the
Mongol army commanded by Mengu Temur in 1281, was made up of Armenians,
Georgians and other auxiliary cavalry.178 There was immense pressure on the Armenian
princes to consistently provide large numbers of troops to the Mongols. HUlegii pushed
for Armenian and Georgian lords to participate in his further conquests or in his wars
against his Mongol relatives, in particular between 1260-65. The Armenians and
Georgians experienced high casualties from both, much more so during the inter-familial
wars. 179 Kirakos of Ganjak attributed the Caucasian lords' rebellion (1259-61) in large
part to the Mongols' great demands for troops. The Georgian King David I (r. 1258-

178
179

Amitai-Preiss, Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 227.
Dashdondog, the Armenians, 156.

70

1293) refused Hiilegii's order to support his conquest of Syria and Egypt by providing
troops. David and the Georgians were exhausted from battling for Baghdad and this was
the reasoning given for his refusal to follow Hiilegii's orders. 180
In addition to the losses incurred by the regular soldiery, the Armenian nobles
experienced significant mortality because of their role as martial leaders. Stepannos
Orbelian related how the young prince Burtel Orbelian was killed in the northern
Caucasus in 1261-62 while serving Hiilegii against Berke Khan, khan of the Golden
Horde (d. 1266).181 Vardan Arewelci related another casualty during the siege of the City
of Martyrs in 1260 during Hiilegii's initial conquest in the Middle East: "The City of
Martyrs was taken after much misery and damage, not only for the besieged but also for
the besieging Tatar soldiers and the Christians with them. They battled each other within
and without; and there the handsome youth Sewada Xaceneci, son of the great prince
Grigor, was killed fighting valiantly. He was crowned with those who keep the faith and
fear of God and of the Il_khan ... ,,182
There were several competing theories on why the Mongols would utilize the
Armenian armies to such a great extent. According to Reuven Amitai-Preiss:
Because the Mongols considered their subject people expendable, they
usually designated them as advance attackers. This was not, as the History
of Kartli and Grigor of Akner would have us believe, because the
Armeno-Georgian troops were such excellent warriors, but first precisely
because the Caucasians were expendable and second, because desertion
was impossible with forei§n troops fighting in front or in detachments
surrounded by Mongols. 18
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If this were the case, certainly the Armenians would not have benefited from this
advance attackers tactic and it certainly called into question the overall worth of the
Armenian-Ilkhanid alliance.
Finally, the Armenians experienced territorial losses as a result of their alliance
with the Ilkhanid Mongols. Cilician Armenia quickly lost all of the lands it had gained
through its raids into northern Syria. The Cilician Armenians' war with the Mamluks
eventually destroyed the entire Kingdom of Cilician Armenia in 1375. If it had not been
for their alliance with the Mongols, the Cilician Armenians may not have come into
direct contact with the Mamluks or instigated Mamluk retaliation. But as this was the
case, the Mamluks crushed them.
In summarizing the above evidence, it was clear that the Armenians experienced
many more negative consequences from their alliance with the Ilkhanid Mongols than
positive consequences. On first consideration this notion may seem surprising as the
prevailing viewpoint of the time was that the Mongols were the most powerful and
successful force in the region and it was presumed that they would continue in this role.
External enemies, such as the Egyptian Mamluks and the Golden Horde, played a part in
keeping the Mongols from fulfilling their lordly obligations to the Armenians, but it was
the demands of the Mongols themselves on their Armenian vassals that ultimately
showed how the Mongol-Armenian alliance was predominantly negative for the
Armenians.
Both Greater Armenia and the kingdom of Cilician Armenia submitted to the
Mongols, although under different circumstances. The princes of Greater Armenia
surrendered after a hard fought resistance, while Cilician Armenia voluntarily
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surrendered before the Mongols could devastate the kingdom. Mongol terms of
submission required the Armenian leaders to provide troops and provisions to the Mongol
army; accept Mongol overlordship; act as a loyal vassal; and pay taxes. In exchange, the
Mongols often returned the land to the nobility and showed political favoritism; offered
pardons and military protection; instilled religious tolerance; preserved internal
administration; instituted selective tax exemptions; and offered noble marriages into the
Chinggisid line. Of these benefits, the Armenians received almost all of them on a
selective basis. The most important benefit, military protection, was sorely lacking.
The Armenians received few of the benefits they actively sought, such as tax
exemptions for churches; the liberation of the Holy Land; the safeguarding of Christianity
in Mongol conquered cities and the spread of Christianity through the Mongol Empire;
the acquisition of land in northern Syria; and the attainment of wealth and political power
in their surrounding regions. The most significant aspect that shaped Mongol-Armenian
relations into a chiefly negative venture for the Armenians was the weight and severity of
Mongol demands. The constant demand for supplies and troops drained both Greater
Armenia and Cilician Armenia, leaving their peoples vulnerable to enemy attacks and
famine. As a result of showing their loyalty to the Mongol alliance, Cilician Armenia was
consistently attacked and devastated by the Mamluks, while Greater Armenia suffered
from the raids of the Golden Horde. The Armenians were never able to negotiate their
own peace treaties, which left them in a constant state of war with an absent military ally.
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THE MONGOLS AND THE EGYPTIAN MAMLUKS
This section will examine primary evidence in English translation relating to the
interactions between the Ilkhanid Mongols and the Egyptian Mamluks. This section will
ultimately argue that based on the analysis of primary and secondary literature, the
Mamluks gained more beneficial outcomes from their adversarial relationship with the
Ilkhanid Mongols and these benefits greatly overshadowed the negatives. Ultimately
waging war on the Mongols proved highly beneficial in the long term for the Mamluks.
This runs contrary to the expectation that being an enemy of the Mongols would prove to
be highly destructive for any of their enemies.
This section will begin with a summary of the Mamluk overthrow of the Egyptian
Ayyubid Sultanate and their initial interactions with the Ilkhanid Mongols. Next, there
will be an analysis of the benefits the Mamluks earned from being an enemy of the
Ilkhanate, both those they actively pursued and those earned unexpectedly. The chief
benefit was that the threat of the Mongols provided the clear impetus to have a martial
ruling system in Egypt and that waging warfare extended the ruling legitimacy for the
Mamluks. It also allowed them to show themselves as the protector and patron of Islam
and they had a clear target in these Mongol outsiders to wage jihad against. Finally, the
Mongol conquest of Baghdad initiated the re-Iocation of the Caliphate in Cairo.
The focus will then shift to analyzing the negative effects the Mamluks
experienced from their war with the llkhanate. These negative effects are divided into
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subtopics: the impact of the Ilkhanid conversion to Islam; the loss of ruling legitimacy
when compared to the noble Chinggisid bloodline; Mongol threats to Mamluk.
commercial interests; as well as material losses.
From the beginning of their interactions with the llkhanid Mongols, the Mamluks
took an adversarial stance. On the eve of Hiilegii's march west, the Mamluks were locked
in an intense civil war. The Mamluks had successfully seized the Egyptian throne in 1250
from the Ayyubid dynasty, but the Mamluks quickly began fighting among themselves.
The newly installed Sultan Aybeg feared the Bahriyya's power and murdered their leader
Faris aI-Din Aqtay. Most of the Bahriyya, some 700 mamluks, with their leader Baybars
fled to Syria in 1254. Baybars and his men spent the next several years serving aI-Nasir
Yusuf, ruler of Aleppo and Damascus, and al-Mughith Umar, ruler of Karak. 184
During this chaotic time, Sultan Aybeg died, leaving the throne to his young son.
Aybeg's favored mamluk, Qutuz, installed the son of Aybeg on the throne as a puppet
and Qutuz ruled through him for a time. Qutuz then deposed the boy and took direct
control in 1259. Qutuz rose to power and justified taking the throne because of the
Mongols' advance west. Upon Qutuz's rise, he and Baybars reconciled and Baybars
returned to Egypt. 185
Despite deposing the Ayyubids in Egypt, the Ayyubid princes remained strong
and influential in others areas of the Middle East, Syria in particular. Upon the eve of the
expected Mongol invasion, the Mamluks attempted to gain Ayyubid allies in Syria, both
to gamer military support and consolidate their own position to avoid war on multiple
fronts. As with the Ilkhanid Mongols, the Mamluk.s had mixed results in securing strong
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alliances with the Ayyubids. They too had to deal with the duplicity of aI-Nasir Yusufb.
al-Aziz Muhammad, ruler of Aleppo and Damascus. One of the main factors for
Baybars's return to Egypt was because Yusuf could not take a decisive stance toward the
Mongols. But the Mamluks did gain a stable ally in aI-Mansur Muhammad b. alMuzaffar Mahmud, ruler of Hama. For his faithfulness he was rewarded by regaining his
kingdom and acquiring the lands ofMaarrat al-Numan and Barin. 186
The Mamluks were military elites of the Eurasian steppe who converted to Islam
and functioned as the urban military class in Egypt. 187 They ruled over large Muslim
populations and based their armies on disciplined masses of mounted archers, which was
a testament to their Kipchak origin. 188 The early Mamluk sultans like Qutuz and Baybars,
created a larger and stronger army through more intense training; firmly managed and
utilized the Bedouins; 189 erected fortifications; established an effective espionage system;
organized the military administration; established rapid communications throughout the
country; and integrated Syria into the Mamluk kingdom. 190
The Mamluks' sources of military manpower came from multiple areas. Their
primary and most reliable source was men from now defunct Ayyubid principalities. The
second was from a steady stream of refugees from Mongol territories. Some were actual
Mongol tribesmen while others were indigenous Muslims, including mamluks, who had
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escaped Mongol contro1. 191 Finally, the Mamluk sultan bought slaves and raised them to
serve in his mamluk royal guard. They also acted as the backbone of his army. The
sultan's amirs raised their own private forces, which included some mamluks. 192
According to Amitai-Preiss, the Mamluks had numerous advantages over their
Mongol enemy:
The Mamluks had the advantage of morale over the enemy. They were
fighting (usually) on home territory, for their religion, their kingdom, and
their lives. They were also defending their status as a ruling caste. To their
mind, they had no choice but to win. The sultans did their best to inculcate
these feelings in their followers. The Mongols may have been fighting for
an abstract imperial ideal, for personal honor, and for booty, but they
could not compete with the Mamluks for motivation. 193

Direct interaction with the Mongols did not come until 1259-60, when the Ilkhan
Hiilegfi sent envoys to Egypt. They delivered a letter to the Sultan Qutuz demanding his
submission to the Ilkhanate. The letter contained verses from the Koran and was couched
in Islamic terms, but the message was clearly Mongol: God [Tenggri] had given the
Mongols the right to rule the world, therefore all should submit to them. Those who
refused would be killed. Hiilegfi also insulted Qutuz's lowly origins as a mamluk. The
Arabic author Ibn al-Furat stated that Hiilegii's letter said the following: "He [Sultan
Qutuz] is of the race ofmamluks who fled before our [Mongol] sword into this [Egypt]
country, who enjoyed its comforts and then killed its rulers [the Ayyubids].,,194 But the
threat in Hiilegii's letter did not prompt Qutuz to submit. Instead, Qutuz received
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permission from his am irs to execute the Mongol envoys. The envoys were cut in half
and their heads were displayed at Bab al-Zuwayla in Cairo. 195

Benefits of an Anti-Mongol Stance
The new Mamluk sultans saw the imminent Mongol threat as the chief means for
shoring up their control over the Egyptian throne. Being a martial class, the Mamluk
leaders argued that they were best equipped to handled the Mongol threat and that they
should rule the kingdom. This type of justification was needed to quell any internal
discord that still remained from Qutuz's controversial rise to power. According to AIJazari: "From the beginning of his reign, Qutuz had pursued an unequivocal anti-Mongol
policy. He had used the need to resist the Mongols as the justification for his disposal of
aI-Mansur Ali b. Aybeg [leader of the Bahriyya] and his own accession to the throne
(November 1259).,,196
The military threat of the Mongols kept the Mamluks' main ruling system, that of
the military, in practice and relevant. According to Linda Northrup:
The military crises of the thirteenth century had demanded discipline.
Galvanized by the Mongol threat and the Crusader presence, the new
Mamluk regime had insisted on hard training, slow promotion and gradual
pay increases. Discipline had instilled a value system in which individual
merit and achievement were eventually well rewarded and which made the
early Mamluk army the strongest in the region at that time ... 197
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This fierce discipline was accompanied by severe punishments and allowed the Mamluk
sultan to rule his military and kingdom with an iron fist. One can see such examples in
the actions of the general, and later Sultan, Baybars: "The [Mamluk] army reacted swiftly
to the slightest rumor of a Mongol offensive and Baybars himself either led the troops or
was right behind them. The continuing war also strengthened his rule, because in the face
of the Mongol danger Baybars would brook no disloyalty.,,198
When it came to clashes on the battlefield with the Mongols, the Mamluks proved
their military prowess. Through numerous victories over the Mongols, who were thought
invincible, the Mamluks exhibited that they could protect the kingdom and hence should
continue to rule. The Mamluks' greatest victory over the Mongols came at Ayn Jalut (the
Pools of Goliath), near Nazareth, on September 3, 1260. Upon hearing that Hiilegii had
pulled out the majority of his troops from Syria only leaving a small force under the
general Kitbugha behind, the Mamluks decided to strike and attempt to dislodge the
Mongols from Syria. In Vardan Arewelci's description of the battle, he attributed the
Mongols' loss to their small numbers:
In the same year the army which the II-khan Hulawu [Hiilegii] had left to
guard the land ofSrun [Syria], about 20,000 men under the great general
called Kitbula [Kitbugha], a Christian by religion, was slaughtered in a
battle against the Sultan of Egypt at the foot of Mount Tabor. He had a
numberless multitude, and since the forces of [Kit-] Bula were few, they
were slaughtered or taken captive. But some scattered and hid and
escaped. They came to the king of Armenia, from whom they found great
compassion; [he provided] clothing, horses, and money, so they returned
gratefully to their lord, Tatars and Christians .199
The Mamluk advance force, under the command of Baybars, found Kitbugha's
army near Tiberias in North Palestine and was joined there by Sultan Qutuz's main army.
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Grigor of Akner gave a similar description of the battle, but with interesting facets of its
own:
Then Kitbuya [Kitbugha], who was the commander of the Tatar force,
becoming overweening, went out to a place ten days journey from
Jerusalem. Then the <doglike> and lawless Egyptians, learning that the
army of Tatars was living in unpreparedness, gathered their forces and
with countless multitudes fell upon the Tatars, killed many of them, put
many to flight, and captured many ... 200
The mamluk Sarim aI-Din Uzbak witnessed the battle from the Mongol side and
described it as a hard fought battle. The Mongols flrst broke the Egyptian left wing, but
Sultan Qutuz rallied his troops and drove the Mongols onto marshy land. The Mongol
commander Kitbugha was killed and the Mongols fled. They then made a stand at
Baysan, but were defeated by Baybars. 201 The battle was hard fought because the armies
were of similar makeup and skill level: "The two armies confronting one another were
similar in that their best troops were horse archers of Turco-Mongol stock, but in both
cases this regular cavalry force was swollen by a larger body of men furnished by allies,
tributaries, skirmishers, tribesmen flghting for the promise ofbooty.,,202
The true victory for the Mamluks was breaking the belief in Mongol invincibility
on the battlefleld. This was a huge morale boost for the Mamluks, proving the military
might of the Bahri mamluks, and would prove to be a powerful tool in future negotiations
with the Ilkhanid Mongols. 203 When considering further beneflts of the Mamluk victory
at Ayn Jalut, scholarly opinions diverge. According to Robert Irwin, the Mamluk victory
only saved the Mamluks for a time and it had not decided anything in the long term
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because the Mongols returned to campaign in Syria in 1261, 1280, 1299, 1301, and
1303.204
According to Northrup, the Mamluk victory at Ayn Jalut delivered Syria fIrmly
into Mamluk hands. Syria before this had been divided among Ayyubid family members
and although a treaty was signed in 1253 to break Ayyubid power, Ayn Jalut fIrmly
confIrmed Mamluk victory over the Ayyubids. 205 A third theory came from David
Saunders who argued that the battle of Ayn Jalut stopped Mongol expansion westward
and saved Cairo. Saunders also said that it saved Islam in the region and stopped
Christian restoration in the Near East. 206 Only hindsight can offer an argument such as
Saunders's. At the time, nothing was certain and the Mongol threat was still very real and
immediate.
The Mamluks successfully utilized their past military victories against the
Mongols to counter Mongol demands for submission, essentially stating that the Mongols
could not make them submit because the Mongols could not defeat the Mamluks on the
battlefield. The mentionings of past victories became a common and effective refrain in
the diplomatic letters that passed back and forth between the Sultan and Ilkhan. After the
Mongols' defeat at the battle of Horns in 1281, the Ilkhan Teguder sent an embassy to
Cairo, demanding that Mamluk raids cease on Ilkhanid lands and for the sultan to submit.
Teguder threatened that he would fight the sultan to expel him from Ilkhanid lands.
The Sultan Qalawun's letter of reply brought up two military thorns in the
Ilkhanid side, Horns and Ayn Jalut, and avoided a direct answer to the demand for
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submission. Qalawun also ridiculed the llkhanid armies who had lost in Syria. 207
Qalawun's answer was as follows: "You [Teguder] send us [Qalawun] word that if strife
is not to cease between us, that we had better choose a battlefield, and that God will give
victory to whom He will. Here is our answer: Those of your troops who survived their
last defeat are not anxious to revisit the former battlefield. They fear to go there again to
renew their misfortunes ... ,,208 By the second Ilkhanid embassy to Egypt, the threat to
fight the sultan was dropped.
This Mamluk confidence in their military continued throughout their interactions
with the Ilkhanate. During the first campaign of the Ilkhan Ghazan in 1299 he dealt the
Mamluks a military blow by defeating them in battle at Wadi al-Khaznadar (although it
was a very costly victory for the Mongols). Despite this defeat, the Mamluks were still
confident in their martial abilities and when Ghazan attempted to use his military victory
in his diplomatic negotiations, the Mamluks successfully countered his demands and
gloating. They did this by trumpeting their numerous victories against the Mongols in the
past. According to Thomas Raff, the Mamluk sultan's courier, Husam ad-Din al-Mugiri,
gave a rendition of the message he was entrusted to relate to Ghazan Khan after the
Mamluks' defeat at Wadi al-Khaznadar. When baited with the question of why the
Mamluks had fled the battlefield, Husam ad-Din al-Mugiri replied:
The army of the Tatars [Mongols] has been fleeing from us [Mamluks] for
sixty years and we have fled only once ... We did not flee from you for fear
of your numbers or of your followers' strength but because we
underestimated you ... We have defeated you numerous times for a period
of sixty years ... So encountering you (on the field) continued to be the
easiest thing possible for us ... We set out against you with but a quarter of
our armies because of our lack of concern for yoU. 209
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Growing military power led to growing political power for the Mamluks. The
Mamluks could and did successfully counter Mongol threats and kept the Mongols at
bay. They also kept the Mongols from aiding their ally, the Armenians. One such
example of this was after the Mamluk Sultan aI-Ashraf sacked the Armenian city of
Hromklay in 1292. The Ilkhan Geikhatu threatened the Sultan, stating that he would take
Aleppo, and the Sultan countered by threatening to take Baghdad. The Sultan's threat
kept Geikhatu in Baghdad and from aiding the Armenians. 2lO
Another aspect of the Mongols that worked in the Mamluks' favor was that the
Ilkhanid Mongols provided a clear example of the 'Other' and the infidel. This allowed
the Mamluk sultans to direct their wars against the Mongols as holy wars,jihad, and to
present themselves as the protectors and saviors of Islam. And as a military regime, the
Mamluks needed to conduct jihad to maintain their legitimacy. Also, any connection to
Islamic holy principles like jihad served to bolster the Mamluk regime, as well since
Islam was the defining social force in Egypt. A good Muslim ruler, as the sultan should
be, had to perform certain obligations for his people and God. In order to connect
themselves with the past regimes and show themselves to be good Muslim rulers (and
worthy of being Muslim rulers), the Mamluks took very seriously the importance of
performing these vital functions. The sultan must protect his lands and subjects as a
military guardian ofIslam and uphold Islamic law (shariah).211 He must participate in
military action against non-Muslim aggressors on behalf of Islam (jihad).212 The duty of
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jihad had fallen into decline with the Ayyubid sultans, but the Mamluks were quick to
revive this discarded combative ideal, as it was the mainstay of their ideology.213
The Armenians also provided a model of 'the Other' and the infidel for the
Mamluks. The Mamluks fought the Christian knights in the Holy Land and they began
their wars with the Armenians in 1259/60. The Armenians certainly saw the Islamic
Mamluks as a threat to Christianity, as shown in Grigor's writings:
The Sultan, learning what the Armenian King's opinion was [to not
surrender], sent many of his troops against the country of the Armenians
by the route of Mari, while he himself took up his position in Xarxe. He
ordered his army to go into the land, mercilessly to slaughter the
Christians, destroy the churches and bum the buildings of towns and
villages, to remain in the land fifteen days and take prisoners the women
and children of the Christians, which they did. 214
The war with the Armenians offered another worthy and valuable jihad for the Mamluks,
which they took advantage of:
[The Mamluks] burned the town of Sis, which was the seat of the
Armenian kings. They cast wood into the fine and great church which was
in the center of Sis and they burned it. They demolished the tombs of the
kings. They killed many Christians and took many captives from the land
and villages. After several days the Turkish [Mamluk] army, with much
treasure and plunder, went to their own country, leaving the land of
Armenia half ruined. 215
Sultan aI-Ashraf Khalil Cr. 1290-1293) certainly took up this idea of utilizing the
'Other' for the justification of war. He defined his rule by martial conquest, expansion,
and universal rule as the Guardian of Islam. Chief among his tasks was warring against
infidels. This belligerent stance was clearly represented in his letters when he used
heraldic titles such as 'Defeater of Infidels' and 'Annihilator of Franks, Armenians, and
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Mongols. ,216 He was also careful to promote policies similar to past sultans, primarily his
father, Qalawun, and Baybars, against the Mongols. Khalil had an easy job of gaining
support for his campaigns against the Mongols because the Ilkhan Geikhatu was a pagan,
i.e. infidel. This eliminated any complicating issues of religion. Khalil could easily show
himself to be the Guardian ofIslam. 217 Prior to Geikhatu's reign (1291-1295) several of
the Ilkhans had converted to Islam, which made the practice of conducting jihad much
more complicated.
Despite the material destruction of Baghdad and the murder of the caliph, the
Islamic Mamluks actually benefited from Baghdad's fall, along with the toppling of the
Caliphate. The Sultan Baybars took the opportunity to establish a new Caliphate in Cairo
in 1260_61. 218 The caliph became central to Mamluk kingship inside their lands since the
Abbasid Caliphate sanctioned Mamluk rule. The caliph also preached jihad and called the
Mamluks 'warriors of the faith,' mujahidun. 219 Baybars attributed great importance to the
establishment of the Caliphate in Cairo and sought to link himself to the caliph as much
as possible. On Baybars's coins and inscriptions he called himself 'associate of the
commander of the faithful.' This linked him with the head of his faith while making him
look pious and humble by not calling himself the commander of the faithful. Ibn al-Furat
wrote of how the caliph gave Baybars an investiture diploma (taqlid) that confirmed
Baybars as sultan. He then called on Baybars to conduct holy war (jihad) and he
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proclaimed Baybars the ruler of all lands of the Mamluk Sultanate and those lands under
the infidel to be liberated. 220
Although there was a significant drain on military manpower as a result of
campaigns against the Mongols, the Mamluks found valuable and capable warriors for
their army among disaffected or rebel Mongols. These units greatly improved the
performance of the Mamluk military and certainly contributed to its long-term success:
"The Kurdish, Turkoman, and Mongol tribal warriors who had joined the Mamluks in the
turmoil accompanying the Mongol advance in the Middle East constituted the most
valuable units of the Haiqa.,,221 The Halqa consisted of freeborn cavalry soldiers of
diverse provenance who served under the Mamluks. The Mamluks also aided rebel
Mongols in their wars against the Ilkhanate, which was usually a benefit for them. One
such example was Sulemish, who was an important Mongol general in Anatolia who
rebelled in the winter of 1289-90. The Mamluks promised to support him. Sulemish
received support and even retreated to Cairo. Unfortunately, this particular venture did
not work out for the Mamluks as Sulemish was quickly defeated by those he betrayed. 222
Until 1295 the Mamluks primarily fought the Ilkhanate on the battlefield and in
diplomacy. But from the Ilkhan Ghazan's conversion to Islam in 1295 forward, the
Mamluks had to contend with the Mongols through religion. There had been Ilkhanid
converts before this time, but they were not able to effect change within the Ilkhanate or
threaten the Mamluks in any way with their conversion. Ghazan Khan (r. 1295 to 1304)
established a strong Muslim legacy with his conversion to Islam and showed his
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commitment to his new religion by largely abandoning the title of'Illillan' and adopting
the Islamic title of 'Sultan' and 'Emperor of Islam.' He also toyed with the title 'Islamic
centennial renewer. ,223
Interestingly, it was the Mongols who opened the door for the Mamluks to
establish themselves as the protector and patron of Islam. According to Northrup:
As a consequence of the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in 1258 and the
transfer of the caliphate to Cairo, the sultan in Cairo had inherited
Baghdad's political and religious role in the region as protector of the two
holy cities in Arabia- Mecca and Medina ... a responsibility which every
sultan took seriously since it served to bolster claims to legitimacy. Thus
the sultan sought to demonstrate his interest in the holy cities symbolically
through the titulary, by sending each year with much pomp and ceremony
the kiswa, or covering of the Kaba, by the construction and repair of
monuments, and by making the pilgrimage when possible. 224
In addition to the religious and symbolic power gained from being the patron of
Islam, the Mamluks also received economic benefits: "The trade routes also carried
pilgrim traffic to the holy sites. Though obliged to secure the safe passage of pilgrims, the
sultan also benefited from the important revenue collected from them. The protection of
these interests thus involved not only diplomacy but occasionally merited limited military
intervention in quarrels between the rulers of the Hijaz.,.225
The Ilkhanate's conversion meant that the Mongols and Mamluks now had to
compete for the same Islamic positions, titles, and honors available in the Islamic
religious community. The two main honorifics were 'Patron ofIslam' and 'Guardian of
Islam.' By the late 1310s, the Mongol and Mamluk rulers were chiefly competing for
these titles and positions through political, material or diplomatic expressions of power.
223 Ghazan's conversion to Islam around 1295 weakened the I1khans' link with the Great Khan and the
Mongol tradition, see Gene R. Garthwaite, The Persians (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 141.
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The martial battlefield had faded. The holy cities of Arabia (the Hijaz) became central to
the expressions of ideology between the Mongols and Mamluks. 226 The Mamluks were
successful in proving themselves the first patron of the Hijaz, forcing the Ilkhan Abu Said
(1316-1335) to accept a secondary position. For a short time the Mamluks lost the upper
hand in the Hijaz, but by 1333, the Sultan Muhammad (r. 1310-1340) had re-estab1ished
his primacy in the Hijaz, despite Abu Said efforts. 227 Any victory over the Mongols,
especially religious, increased Mamluk power. As the Mamluks continued to rise, the
Ilkhanate began to fade.
In addition to competing as the primary patron of Islam, the two superpowers of

the Middle East also competed over which ruler, the Mamluk or Ilkhanid sultan, ruled by
the virtues of a true Muslim king. The ability to show that he ruled by Islamic law and
virtues greatly improved a sultan's image and power, as well as legitimacy. Both the
Mamluks and the Ilkhanid sultans needed this legitimacy. Two important kingly virtues
were justice tempered with mercy228 and obedience to God. The sultan also had to show
that he was God's Chosen Ruler. 229
Finally, the Mamluks experienced material benefits from their adversarial stance
against the Mongols. The threat of the Mongols in Syria compelled the majority of the
Syrian factions to side with the Mamluks, thus the Mamluks gained these Syrian
territories. 23o Syria became and remained a permanent territory of the Mamluk kingdom
long after the Ilkhanate had collapsed. Again, the actions of the Mongols had unintended
consequences for the Mamluks, but ultimately to their benefit. In the realms of trade "the
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expansion of the Mongols eventually opened up new trade routes with central Asia to
supplement those linking Egypt to the east via the Red Sea: commercial links in the
Mediterranean between Egypt and Latin crusades ... ,.231 This was especially important for
the Mamluks because Egypt depended on the trade of luxury goods for much of its
material wealth and these goods came from India and the East. These routes then passed
through Egypt and Syria to European markets.
The Mamluks also experienced a heightening of cultural and intellectual activity,
as Cairo replaced fallen Baghdad as the principal center for the cultural activity of the
Islamic Near East. 232 According to Northrup: "The Egyptian capital functioned as a
cultural magnet, attracting Muslim scholars and others from throughout the Near East,
immigrants who lent a profoundly cosmopolitan air to Egyptian society, at least at its
higher levels.,,233 This heightened culture would remain in the Mamluk kingdom and
many of Islam's greatest treasures and achievements were created during the Mamluk
period.

Negative Effects of an Anti-Mongol Stance

There were several major setbacks that the Mamluks experienced from their
interactions with the Ilkhanid Mongols, the most serious of which threatened the
Mamluks' continued existence as a ruling class and their control of the Sultanate.
Throughout their rule, the Mamluks suffered from an extremely weak claim to the throne.
This was clearly because of their origins as slaves. The Mamluks were ridiculed for their

Northrup, "The Bahri Mamluk sultanate," 376.
Ibid. 376.
233 Ibid. 376.
231

232

89

slave origins, but they were also ridiculed for their absolute lack of proper or royal
lineage. These shortcomings may have not been so debilitating if the foe the Mamluks
pitted themselves against had a lesser lineage as well. Instead, the Mongols sported one
of the strongest lineages in the Middle East during this time. It was based both on
military prowess and well-established royal bloodlines. The Ilkhanate was still a symbol
of Mongol prestige and carried the weight of the Chinggisid Divine Mandate.

234

F or the Mongols, the rule of the Mamluks was an affront to all those who ruled as
a right of their noble blood. The Mamluks carried no royal blood and even worse, they
were slaves and continued this slave system. Those who ruled as sultans in the Mamluk
kingdom had began their careers as slaves and only those who had been slaves, mamluks,
were eligible to rule according to the Mamluk sultanate system. For the Mongols, a ruling
and military system based on slaves was perverse and could only be weak and
ineffectual. Other nomads and Mongolians were enslaved during Chinggis's reign and
were incorporated into a hereditary system of slavery (Otegii boghul); slavery was the
condition of lesser people. 235 The Mamluks did have some understanding of this type of
slavery, since they were of Turkish Kipchak origin and such slavery was typical in
nomadic societies.
The Mongols and their allies the Armenians insulted and degraded the Mamluk
sultans during most of their diplomatic interactions. When Hiilegii demanded the
submission of the Mamluk Sultan Qutuz in 1260, Hiilegii denigrated Qutuz for his servile
origins. Hiilegii's Armenian ally, Hetum I, called the Sultan Baybars a dog and slave and
refused to deal with him. Grigor related one version of this event; "On his way to Egypt
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the Sultan of Egypt died and they appointed Pntuxtar [Baybars] Sultan of Egypt. Having
heard this, the King of the Annenians called him a <dog> and a slave.,,236
Grigor described another episode, which related the diplomatic tensions between
the Mamluks and Armenians. In this episode, the Mamluk Sultan Baybars harassed the
Armenian prince, Lewon, the first son of Hetum I. Lewon at this time was in Mamluk
custody after being captured in battle:
After this the Sultan spoke to Lewon and said, 'Your father called me a
slave and would not make peace. Am I the slave now, or you?' He said
this and many other words of reproach to the King's son, and then
thereafter he greatly honored him and showed him affection, uttering
words of comfort, not to fear anything, but to remain cheerful for some
days and then he would send him back to his father the King of the
Armenians. With these words the Sultan Pntuxtar [Baybars] sent Baron
Lewon to Egypt. 237
The fact that the Annenians could use such an insult against the Mamluks must
have infuriated the Mamluks and further eroded their ruling legitimacy. In his letters to
the Mamluk Sultan Qalawun in 1299-1300, the Ilkhan Ghazan showed his disdain for the

mamluk slaves and their lack of lineage. He labeled them as the lowest race, min ardhal
al-ajnas.238 This was clearly an issue of great insult to the Mongols throughout their rule
in the Ilkhanate and a consistent and effective means of quickly establishing their
political superiority over the Mamluks.
The Mamluks sought to compensate for their political weakness and concurrently
counter the threat posed by the Ilkhanid's bloodline through a variety of means. The most
interesting policy was the Mamluk attempts to marry into the Chinggisid line. Irwin
stated: "[the fact that] the Mongols still retained their social prestige is indicated by the
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series of missions sent by the Sultan to the lands of the Golden Horde to secure a Mongol
princess. In the end [Sultan] aI-Nasir Muhammad did briefly marry Tulubiyya, a greatgreat-grand-daughter ofChingiz Khan.,,239 This marriage arrangement clearly shows the
Mamluk desire to link into the Chinggisid line, albeit through their relationship with the
Golden Horde. Despite being an adversary, the Mamluks still sought several marriage
arrangements with the Ilkhanate, as illustrated in the negotiations conducted by the last
Illillan Abu Said. Choban, the regent of Abu Said, sought policies to increase Mongol
power, particularly through his style of negotiating marriages. He mostly showed his
power against the Mamluk ambassadors by declining their marriage proposals, which
showed great insult to the sultan.

24o

The second greatest threat the Ilkhanids posed to the Mamluk ruling system was
in their conversion to Islam. The Mamluks now had a new contender for the title of
'Guardian (Protector) ofIslam' and 'the Patron of Islam.' During the years of Mongol
shamanist rule in Iran, the older Islamic models of legitimacy were not utilized as much.
When the Ilkhans converted to Islam there was a fusion of Mongol and Islamic ruling
traditions. They ruled both as divinely favored descendants of Chinggis Khan as well as
Muslim sultans who were advised by Islamic scholars. Some Mongol rulers liked aspects
ofIslamic kingship.241 The Ilkhan Teguder (r. 1282-1284) converted to Islam and took
the name Ahmad and the title of' Sultan.' This conversion and subsequent ones destroyed
the Mamluks' main case for their rule: that the Ilkhanate was an infidel oppressor and the
Mamluks were the protectors of Muslim society and the Guardian of Islam. 242 Beginning
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with the reign of Teguder the Ilkhans vacillated between Muslim and Pagan leadership.
Ghazan ruled as a Muslim and called himself the Guardian of Islam, making a direct
challenge to the Mamluk sultan. Ghazan was also the first Ilkhanid ruler to break with the
Mongol tradition of secret burial for the khan. Instead he built an Islamic mausoleum. 243
The Ilkhan Oljeitu (r. 1304-1316) continued his brother Ghazan's Islamic legacy
upon his accession to the throne. Oljeitu's birth name was Islamic, Muhammad
Kharbandah, and he adopted the title of 'Sultan.' Also upon his accession, he took the
regnal title 'Oljeitu,' meaning 'Auspicious.' Oljeitu upheld Ghazan's laws, despised the
Abbasid Caliph, and believed in his legitimacy through his descent from Chinggis Khan.
Oljeitu's diplomatic letters still referred to the Enduring Sky (Tenggri) as God. 244 Oljeitu
himself religiously experimented before finally accepting Shia Islam,245 while his
successor, Abu Said, was a Sunni Muslim.
When the Ilkhan Teguder demanded submission from the Sultan Qalawun in
September 1282, his letter and ambassador were very much influenced by Islamic
principles. His second embassy to the Mamluk Sultanate was led by his spiritual leader
Shaykh Abd aI-Rahman as requested by Qalawun. Teguder's letter asked only for a
peaceful agreement and not submission, but his letter was not taken well as Qalawun
treated the Mongol diplomats poorly after the message was heard. The Sultan kept the
diplomats imprisoned and aI-Rahman died in Mamluk hands. 246
In both his letters and actions, Teguder was a rival to Qalawun as a virtuous
Muslim ruler. Teguder stated that he had done the following as a virtuous Muslim ruler:
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established Islamic law; pardoned criminals; inspected Islamic endowments; constructed
new religious buildings; and regularized protection for pilgrimage caravans. Teguder was
an especial threat to Qalawun's legitimacy because he founded holy buildings and acted
as a protective sovereign over the holy cities and pilgrimages. 247 Great tensions were also
created in the patronage of the Hijaz when the regent Choban acted independently of the
Ilkhan Abu Said and pursued policies to increase Mongol power and promote his belief in
Mongol supremacy by conducting great building programs in Mecca and Medina. This
certainly aggravated the Mamluks. 248 Ghazan's letters took a different approach. He used
Islamic religious thought to construct his argument that the Mamluks should submit to
the Mongols. His argument stated that since the Ilkhan was now a Muslim, the Mongols
and Mamluks were fellow brothers, and the Mamluks had nothing to fear in joining the
Ilkhan's subjects. Ghazan implied that he would restore rule to kings rather than it remain
with slaves, i.e. the Mamluks. 249
The Mamluks countered the Mongol threat to their political superiority in the
Hijaz by proclaiming religious superiority as a result of their earlier conversion to Islam.
The Mamluk Sultan Muhammad proclaimed himself 'first among Muslim equals. ,250
Muhammad's argument was that the Mamluks had been practicing Muslims for a much
longer time than the Mongols and therefore could offer sounder religious guidance and
protection to the lands ofIslam, the Dar ai-Islam. The Sultan Qalawun also utilized the
concept of precedence in conversion to counter the Ilkhan Teguder's demand for
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submission. 251 Since Qalawun had converted to Islam first, he was senior in religion to
Teguder; therefore Teguder could not make such demands of Qalawun. It also meant that
as a senior in religion, Qalawun was more fit to rule (and to keep his position) than
Teguder. The Mamluks encountered this religious threat in the 1320s and the first half of
the 1330s because as the weakening Ilkhanid military ceased to be a threat to the
Mamluks, the Ilkhans sought different avenues to challenge the power of the Mamluk
sultans. The Ilkhans pursued the mantle of the primary religious patron of the Islamic
world, a title long held by the Mamluk sultans,252 but ultimately failed in this venture.
During the reigns of the first Muslim Ilkhans, the Mamluk sultans found it most
effective to attack the Ilkhans' sincerity in their conversions to Islam. According to Ibn
Abd al-Zathir, who was a historian and head chancery official of Baybars and Qalawun,
Teguder's conversion was fake and he was portrayed as a false convert.253 But by the
time of the Ilkhan Ghazan, the Mamluks found more success in combating the Mongols
by proving that the Ilkhan was not a good Muslim ruler, instead of refuting his
conversion. 254 The Mamluks refuted Ghazan's statement of having God's support by
saying that Ghazan was misguided for claiming God's approval and that God actually
supported the Mamluks. 255
An even more potent threat to the Mamluks was when the Ilkhanid Mongols

combined Islam with their superior Chinggisid lineage. In Ghazan Khan's letters to the
sultan, written around his October 1299 campaign into Syria and his victory at the battle
of Wadi al-Khaznadar, he expressed the superiority of his Chinggisid heritage by
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utilizing Islamic chancery practices and conventions. The utilization of both Islamic and
Mongol symbols allowed the Ilkhans to combat both the Mamluks and other peoples on
superior ideological grounds. 256 This double utilization occurred on some of Ghazan's
minted coins; some had both Mongolian and Arabic names for God, Tenggri and
Allah.257
Ghazan provides a good example of this double utilization. As a Muslim, Ghazan
stated that he was the 'divinely chosen arbiter of justice' and as such he could give
authority to those he chose. Ghazan said that God bestowed royal authority on Chinggis
Khan and that he was the sixth in this illustrious line.258 This belief perfectly melded the
two ideologies. Ghazan boasted the prestige of his bloodline, while showing that the
Islamic God favored Chinggis Khan. Ghazan was an appropriate ruler on both accounts.
Another negative consequence of the Mamluks' wars with the Ilkhanate was the
threat and actual loss of some of their Ayyubid allies. Sunqur al-Ashqar, the viceroy of
Damascus, went against the Sultan Qalawun and declared his ruling independence in
Damasacus. The Mongols under the general Mongke Temur and their Armenian allies
took advantage of the fight between Qalawun and Sunqur al-Ashqar, possibly at Sunqur's
urging, and sacked Aleppo in 1260. But the Mamluks were politically victorious in
regaining Sunqur's allegiance and Mongol progress was stopped at the battle of Homs in
1281.259 Other difficult Ayyubid princes included AI-Nasir Yusuf, who continually
vacillated his support, and AI-Mughith Umar of Karak, who was accused of treating with
the Mongols. The Mamluks also had to contend with other weak links in the region,
The usage of Mongolian ideas and terms in letters addressed to the Mamluks often weakened Ghazan's
position as a Muslim, so his ideas were put into Islamic terms, see Broadbridge, Kingship & Ideology, 84.
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namely Bohemond VI of Antioch-Tripoli, who was connected to the Cilician Armenian
family through marriage, hence he allied with Armenia and the Mongols.

26o

Additionally, circumstances that began as advantageous for the Mamluks quickly
proved to be of a more duplicitous nature. The Mamluks gained numerous highly skilled
Mongol warriors, who were either rebels from the Ilkhanid army or displaced refugee
nomadic peoples pushed into Mamluk territory. These refugees began arriving in late
1261 from Hiilegii's army.261 These Mongols were incorporated into the Mamluks'
second most talented military unit, the Wafidiyya, and proved their fighting abilities. But
some of these Mongol units created political turmoil in the Mamluk army. One such
example occurred in the winter of 1299, when Ghazan Khan crossed the Euphrates River
with a mixed army of Mongols, Armenians and Georgians, along with the Mamluk emirs
Qibjaq and Baktimur. While on their way against Ghazan's army, the Mamluk army was
thrown into turmoil by a rebellious plot hatched by the Mongol Oirat Wafidiyya. They
planned to murder the sultan and his officers and put the Mongol mamluk Kitbugha back
on the sultan's throne. 262 Although this plot was foiled and hundreds ofOirats were
killed, it showed the military disasters that could occur when dealing with Mongol
dissidents.
The Ilkhanate also presented a significant threat to Egyptian commercial interests
and their presence negatively impacted the operations of the Mamluk Sultanate. To what
extent the Ilkhanate's actions crippled the Sultanate is less clear. The Ilkhanate's
operations in Cilician Armenia significantly threatened the Mamluks' access to the

mamluk slave-trading region in the Black Sea. As Northrup explained:
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Critical. .. was the threat posed to the slave trade, vital to the existence of
the Mamluk regime, which was conducted along routes passing through
Mongol territory. Increasingly this concern became intertwined with the
competition in the region for the east-west trade. Indeed, it is clear that
commercial concerns underlay much of Mamluk diplomatic and even
military activity during the Bahri period. 263
The initial Mongol conquest and the subsequent re-conquest by Hiilegii created a
vast new trade zone, which ran through the newly established Ilkhanate. There were two
main routes that concerned the Ilkhans. The more established route was the southern sea
route, which linked eastern lands via the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Nile with the
Mediterranean. 264 These southern sealanes were often under the control of the Mamluks
and the Mamluk sultans struggled to maintain controll over this southern route from
which they stood to reap large benefits. 265 The second route was a more northerly route,
which became an attractive alternative to the southern route and had the potential to
undercut the Mamluks' southerly route. The Ilkhanate owned this northerly route, along
with their Genoese allies, and competed with the Mamluk routes for a century after the
initial Mongol conquest. The Ilkhanids allowed the Genoese access to the eastern oceans,
but the Ilkhans were also involved in the region. The Ilkhan Arghun created a naval fleet
in Baghdad with the intention of seizing the Mamluks' shipping lanes in the Red Sea?66
Issues of trade and religious patronage merged to create a prolonged conflict
between the Ilkhanids and the Mamluks in the Arabian Peninsula. Northrup provided an
explanation of this conflict and its importance in the overall Mongol-Mamluk rivalry:
In 1315-16, if not earlier, the Ilkhanids became involved in local rivalries
in Mecca and sought to use them, just as the Mamluks did, to exert
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influence. Though an effort to conquer the Hijaz by the sharif of Mecca267
with a force furnished by the Illillan Oljeitu failed, the sharif did capture
Mecca with Mongol assistance two years later, whereupon the name of the
Illillan Abu Said (1316-35) was mentioned in the khutba. 268 Underlying
religious and political interests in the region, therefore, was the imperative
to protect the Sultanate's commercial interests in the lands of the Red Sea
basin (Arabia, Upper Egypt and Nubia, Ethiopia) and the Indian Ocean
(e.g. Ceylon, Sind, Hind, China). Mamluk diplomatic and military
activities in these lands must be viewed, therefore, at least partially in the
light of these concerns. 269
Finally, the Ilkhanate created a rather difficult situation for the Mamluks when the
Ilkhanate collapsed in 1335. The Mamluks' greatest enemy had dissipated, which left this
military regime without an external threat. The Mamluks, as a military regime, needed a
strong external enemy to continually justify their presence and rule. It was clear by the
1320s and 1330s that the Ilkhanate no longer posed a military threat to the Mamluks.
With no strong enemy to face and the coming of a period of relative peace, the Mamluk
military structure became lax and the Mamluk ruling elite lost power. Finally, "[with] the
disintegration of the Ilkhanid state ... the Bahri regime entered a period of peace,
prosperity and internal stability. The military ethic that had served so well during a time
of crisis began to deteriorate ... ,,270 Despite this setback, the Mamluks continued to rule
Egypt for another two hundred years, unti11517.
In summarizing the above evidence, it was clear that the Mamluks experienced

many more positive consequences from their stance against the Ilkhanid Mongols. On
first consideration this notion may seem surprising as the prevailing viewpoint of the time
was that the Mongols were the most powerful and successful force in the region and it
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268 The khutbalkhutab was the sermon preached by the khatib in mosques at Friday noon prayer; also the
acknowledgement of the Caliph or ruler, see Petry, The Cambridge History ofIslam, 531.
269 Northrup, "The Bahri Mamluk sultanate," 283.
270 Ibid. 261-62.
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was presumed that they would continue in this role. No one expected the Mamluks to
defeat the Mongols at Ayn Jalut and to ultimately outlast the Ilkhanate.
The Mamluk sultans quickly realized the benefit of the Mongol menace, utilizing
its threat as a way to solidify their ruling legitimacy. This was especially important since
the Mamluks had just taken the Egyptian throne. The Mamluks also actively attacked the
religious legitimacy of the Ilkhanate, both before and after the Ilkhans' conversion to
Islam. This helped the Mamluks boast of their Islamic virtues and their re-establishement
of the Caliphate in Cairo assured the Caliph's support of the Mamluk rulers.
Some of the negative effects the Mamluks experienced from the Mongols
included material losses, the loss of life and allies, the loss of territory and commerce, but
most importantly, the great loss of ruling legitimacy and the continued weakness of their
bloodline in comparison to the Chinggisids. Although it was a long hard-fought war
against the Ilkhanate, the Mamluks were able to stop the Mongol advance. Still more
amazing was that the Mamluks were able to capitalize on their victories over the
Ilkhanate which propelled them to military supremacy in the Middle East. The Mamluks'
continual resistance and pressure on the Mongols assisted in the collapse of the Ilkhanate
in 1335. The Mamluks then sealed their revenge against the Kingdom ofCilician
Armenia with its complete conquest in 1375.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis sought to address a gap in the available academic literature on the
Mongol presence in the Middle East and relations between the Ilkhanate and its
neighbors. Some research was available on the relationship between the Mongols and the
Mamluks; the Mamluks and Armenians; and the Mongols and the Armenians. There was
no source dedicated directly to the study of the Ilkhanid-Armenian-Mamluk relationship.
The study of this trifold relationship yielded numerous unique insights into the Ilkhanid
presence in the Middle East, as well as the Mamluk relationship with the Ilkhanate and
Armenia. This work sought to show this trifold relationship as a phenomenon of its own
and as an adequate framework through which to study the medieval Middle East. It
ultimately sought to provide calculations of advantages and disadvantages for both the
Armenians and Mamluks in regards to their relationships with the Ilkhanid Mongols. The
conclusion was that the benefits the Mamluks gained from being adversaries of the
Ilkhanid Mongols far outweighed the negative consequences. Whereas with the
Armenians, their alliance with the Mongol proved overwhelmingly negative.
Owing to the comparative and expansive nature of the topic, this thesis utilized a
plethora of different primary sources, including sources in Armenian, Persian, Arabic,
and Syriac. All of these works were studied through English translations, both in
complete translations and partial translations found in secondary sources. The major
contemporary Armenian authors included Grigor of Akner, Kirakos of Ganjak, and
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Varden Arewelci. The major Persian authors included Juwayni, Rashid aI-Din, Nasir alDin Tusi, and Juzjani. The most important Arabic authors for the thesis were Ibn al-Athir
followed by Ibn Abd al-Zathir and Baybars al-Mansuri.
The primary sources from the period studied, 1220-1335, clearly exhibited
relationships among the Ilkhanid Mongols, the Armenians, and the Egyptian Mamluks.
When the Mongols arrived in Persia, they seemed unstoppable. The peoples the Mongols
encountered had to decide how they would deal with this new power player in the region.
The Armenians, from Greater Armenia and Cilician Armenia, submitted to the Mongols
and became Mongol vassals. The Mamluks chose an adversarial stance and were
successful in repelling the Mongols. All three groups received political benefits from
their relations with the other two. Such benefits included monetary and territorial gains,
religious or political freedoms, and military protection, to name a few. Each relationship
also bore its share of negative effects, from the mundane to catastrophic.
The Ilkhanid Mongols' relations with the Armenians and Mamluks were shaped
by the concept of the Divine Mandate: the Mongol belief that God (Tenggri) had
ordained that the Mongols would rule the world. As such, the Mongols were God's
Chosen and they served God's will through their conquests. Any people who resisted the
Mongols were resisting God's will. This labeled them as both rebels and heretics. Also as
a result of the Divine Mandate, the Mongols conceived of the world in a 'conqueror and
conquered' mentality in which the Mongols were always the superior force. It also meant
that other peoples were seen in two ways, those who submitted to the Mongols and those
yet to submit, i.e. enemies. This framework worked well with the Armenians because
they had submitted to the Mongols and served their new masters well. Unfortunately, the
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Mamluks greatly challenged this framework, because the Mongols could never conquer
them.
There were several significant benefits the Mongols' enemies could receive if
they submitted. The submitted kingdom/nobles could receive their lands back as well as
receive additional land. They could also receive local jurisdiction over their lands if they
provided consistent taxes to the Mongols. Another important benefit was the conveying
of official pardons, which meant that those who submitted could not be prosecuted for
their previous belligerent stance. Additionally, those who submitted could receive greater
political benefits over their local or regional rivals, as well as possible political marriages
to Mongol princesses and desirable military service and accolades. The Mongols also
offered religious tolerance and promoted individuals through merit and loyal service with
less emphasis on blood relations. The last extremely valuable benefit was the military
protection offered by the Mongols.
For the Greater Armenians and Cilician Armenians, their relationship with the
Ilkhanid Mongols proved to be overwhelmingly negative. Much of the failure of the
Annenian-Ilkhanid alliance hinged on the Mongols' inability to offer adequate military
protection to the Annenians. The Mamluks were able to conduct numerous devastating
raids on the Cilician-Annenians and ultimately crushed the Kingdom of Cilician
Armenia. The Golden Horde and rebel Mongols were able to devastate the lands of
Greater Armenia. Additonally, the Armenians had to provide substantial material and
personnel support to the Mongols, which greatly weakened the Armenians' defenses and
economies. In addition to great material losses, the Armenians also experienced great
losses in human life, particularly the nobility and soldiery.
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For the Mamluks, their relationship as an enemy of the Ilkhanid Mongols proved
overly advantageous and greatly aided in the meteoric rise of the Mamluks as a powerful
kingdom. The threat of the Mongols pushed the Mamluk political factions to a unified
purpose: to defend the kingdom. The Mamluks, who had just stolen the Egyptian throne,
were able to solidify their control over the throne by justifiying the need for a martial
ruling class to resist the Mongols. The continual threat of the Mongols in Syria kept the
Mamluks on the Egyptian throne. Their numerous military victories against the
'unstoppable' Mongols also secured their position. The Mamluks were able to gain
further ruling legitimacy by re-establishing the Caliphate in Cairo; becoming the
protectors of Islam; and being the defenders of the faith through jihad against the infidels,
i.e. the Mongols and Armenians.
Ultimately this thesis aimed to show that the study of any one of these three
groups during the thirteenth century must include an understanding of how these three
groups, the Ilkhanid Mongols, Armenians, and Mamluks, were connected. The Mamluks
came into their own fighting against the Mongols and became a mighty power that ruled
Egypt until 1517. The Kingdom of Cilician Armenia fell in 13 75 as a result of Mamluk
attacks. Perhaps surprisingly, the Ilkhanate was the first to collapse in 1335. Although the
Ilkhanate had a short existence, it shaped the Middle East in unexpected ways, especially
through its relationships with the Armenians and Mamluks. The Ilkhanate stood as a
complex society that maintained much of its Mongol character while being intimately
intertwined with the rest of the Middle East, contributing significantly to the history of
the region.
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APPENDIX
Reigns of the Rulers of the Ilkhanate, the Kingdom of Cilician Armenia, and the Mamluk
Kingdom of Egypt

Mongol Rulers of the Ilkhanate
Rulers
Reign
1256-1265
Hiilegii
1265-1282
Abaqa
1282-1284
Ahmad Teguder
1284-1291
Arghun
1291-1295
Geikhatu
1295
Baidu
1295-1304
Mahmud Ghazan
1304-1316
Muhammad Kharbandah Oljeitu
1316-1335
Abu Said Bahadur

Rulers of the Kingdom of Cilician Armenia
Reign
Ruler
1226-1270
Hetum I
1270-1289
Lewon II
1289-1293
Hetumll
1293-1298
Toros III
1295-1296
Hetum II, co-ruler with Toros III
Sempad, usurper
1296-1298
Constantine I
1298-1299
1299-1303
Hetum II, reclaimed the throne, abdicated and regent for Lewon III
1303-1307
Lewon III, under regency of Hetum II
1307-1320
Oshin
1320-1341
LewonlV
1342-1344
Constantine II
1344-1362
Constantine III
1362-1373
Constantine IV
1374-1375
Lewon V
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Sultans of the Mamluk Kingdom of Egypt
Reign
Ruler
AI-Muizz Aybeg al-Turkmani
1250-1257
1257-1259
AI-Mansur Ali b. Aybeg
1259
AI-Muzaffar Qutuz
1260-1277
AI-Zathir Baybars al-Bunduqdari
1277-1279
AI-Said Berke Khan b. Baybars
1279
AI-Adil Sulamish b. Baybars
1279-1290
AI-Mansur Qalawun b. Alfi
1290-1293
AI-Ashraf Khalil b. Qalawun
1293-1294
AI-Nasir Muhammad b. Qalawun (first reign)
1294-1296
AI-Adil Ketbugha
1296-1299
AI-Mansur Lachin
1299-1309
AI-Nasir Muhammad b. Qalawun (second reign)
1309-1310
AI-Muzaffar Baybars al-lashnakir
1310-1340
AI-Nasir Muhammad b. QaIawun (third reign)
1340-1382
Various descendants of aI-Nasir Muhammad until 1382
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MAPS

Map 1. Asia after 1260 CE, showing territory under Mongol control and the Mongol
Khanates. 271

271 Amitai

Preiss, The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 236.
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